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The dualism of jus ad bellum and jus in bello is at the heart of all that is 
most problematic in the moral reality of war. 
—Michael Walzer1 
 
[I]t may happen that neither of the Parties in War acts unjustly. For no 
Man acts unjustly, but he who is conscious that what he does is unjust; and 
this is what many are ignorant of. 
—Hugo Grotius2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 9, 2007, a trial chamber of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL) sentenced two leaders of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), one 
of the parties to Sierra Leone’s civil war.3 The Chamber had convicted them 
of exceptionally brutal crimes: mutilation, amputation, hacking civilians to 
death with machetes, and other sadistic killings.4 Among relevant mitigating 
factors, however, it noted that the defendants had fought for “a legitimate 
cause”: “to restore the democratically elected Government of President 
Kabbah.” 5  It held that their sentences should therefore be mitigated 
significantly, for although their conduct transgressed “acceptable limits,” they 
served a “cause that is palpably just and defendable”: “facilitating the 
restoration of democracy, peace and security in [Sierra Leone]”—precisely the 
objective the Security Council sought to achieve by encouraging the SCSL’s 
establishment.6 Furthermore, the Chamber opined, absent mitigation, militias 
in future civil wars might not intervene on behalf of legitimate governments. 
Their members might fear that they, too, would be judged harshly after the 
conflict.7 
The SCSL Appeals Chamber emphatically disagreed, noting that the 
trial chamber’s adoption of just cause as a mitigating factor violated “[t]he 
basic distinction and historical separation between jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello,” which it accurately characterized as “a bedrock principle” of the law of 
war.8  It also stressed that “[a]llowing mitigation for a convicted person’s 
                                                                                                                                                                         
1. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (1977); see also BRIAN OREND, WAR AND 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE 50 (2000). 
2. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1130 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 
2005) (1625) (emphasis omitted).  
3. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Sentencing Judgement (Oct. 
9, 2007). 
4. Id. ¶ 46; see also id. ¶¶ 45-48, 52-54. In particular, the Trial Chamber convicted the 
defendants of violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, see, e.g., Geneva 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III], and of Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts, adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
5. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Sentencing Judgement, ¶ 83. 
6. Id. ¶¶ 86-88; see also S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). 
7. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Sentencing Judgement, ¶¶ 90-91. But cf. David Luban, 
War Crimes: The Law of Hell, in WAR: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 266, 278 (Larry May ed., 
2008) (arguing that “stripping belligerent immunity from rebels may deter surrender and protract civil 
wars”). 
8. Prosecutor v. Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-A, Judgement, ¶¶ 529-30 (May 
28, 2008). 
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political motives, even where they are considered . . . meritorious . . . . 
provides implicit legitimacy to conduct that unequivocally violates the law—
the precise conduct this Special Court was established to punish.”9 In short, 
for the trial chamber, mitigation based on the “just cause” for which the 
defendants fought promoted the SCSL’s goals (and those of the law of war 
generally); for the Appeals Chamber, it undermined them. 
This case reflects, in microcosm, a pressing issue in the contemporary 
law of war. After 9/11, countless scholars and statesmen have called for 
changes in the jus ad bellum, the law governing resort to force, or the jus in 
bello, the law governing the conduct of hostilities. 10  These invitations to 
reform, whatever their merit, raise an equally vital but distinct legal issue that 
has been largely neglected in recent legal scholarship: the relationship 
between the traditional branches of the law of war.11 Since the U.N. Charter 
introduced a positive jus ad bellum into international law, the reigning dogma 
has been that reflected in the SCSL Appeals Chamber’s opinion: the jus ad 
bellum and the jus in bello are, and must remain, analytically distinct. In bello 
rules and principles apply equally to all combatants, whatever each 
belligerent’s avowed ad bellum rationale for resorting to force: self-defense, 
the restoration of democratic government, territorial conquest, or the 
destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.12 It is 
immaterial, on this view, whether the ad bellum intent of the militia leaders 
indicted by the SCSL had been to restore a democratic government or to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
9. Id. ¶ 534; accord Prosecutor v. Kordić & Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgement, 
¶ 1082 (Dec. 17, 2004) (“The unfortunate legacy of wars shows that . . . many perpetrators believe that 
violations of binding international norms can be lawfully committed, because they are fighting for a ‘just 
cause.’”). 
10. The literature is vast. See, e.g., NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 
21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter 
& William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (2002); John 
Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004); John B. Bellinger, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Speech at Oxford University: Prisoners in War: Contemporary Challenges to the Geneva 
Conventions (Dec. 10, 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/rls/96687.htm. But see Jordan J. 
Paust, Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guantanamo, the Status of 
Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in Military Commissions, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1335 (2004) (arguing that the existing law of war can accommodate contemporary 
warfare); see also Steven R. Ratner, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 905 (2002); W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims To Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 
(2003). For the author’s views on some of these issues, see Robert D. Sloane, Prologue to a Voluntarist 
War Convention, 106 MICH. L. REV. 443 (2007). 
11. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, the eminent scholar and former judge of the International Court of 
Justice, wrote a seminal article on this issue shortly after the introduction of the jus ad bellum of the 
U.N. Charter. H. Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 206 
(1953); see also LOTHAR KOTZSCH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-126 (1956). Christopher Greenwood treated the issue relatively more recently 
in a brief essay written during the waning days of the Cold War. Christopher Greenwood, The 
Relationship Between Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUD. 221 (1983). The issue has 
otherwise been largely neglected in postwar legal scholarship. For two recent exceptions, see Alexander 
Orakhelashvili, Overlap and Convergence: The Interaction Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 12 
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 157 (2007); and Marco Sassòli, Ius ad Bellum and Ius in Bello—The 
Separation Between the Legality of the Use of Force and Humanitarian Rules To Be Respected in 
Warfare: Crucial or Outdated, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: EXPLORING THE 
FAULTLINES 241 (Michael Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). 
12. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
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topple that government and install a brutal regime in its stead: they must 
adhere to and be judged by the same in bello rules and principles. 
Postwar international law regards this analytic independence as 
axiomatic,13 as do most just war theorists. They insist that “[i]t is perfectly 
possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought 
in strict accordance with the rules.”14 In theory, then, any use of force may be 
simultaneously lawful and unlawful: unlawful, because its author had no right 
to resort to force under the jus ad bellum; lawful, if and to the extent that its 
author observes “the rules,” that is, the jus in bello.15 I will refer to this 
particular rule, which insists on the analytic independence of ad bellum and in 
bello, as the dualistic axiom. Despite its widespread acceptance,16 the axiom, 
as we will see, is logically questionable, 17  undertheorized, and at times 
disregarded or misapplied in practice—with troubling consequences for the 
policies that underwrite these components of the contemporary law of war. 
Consider briefly a few examples, which, among others, will be explored in 
greater detail below: 
 
• In 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) carried out 
a four-month air campaign against Serbia. At the outset, NATO’s 
leaders made an in bello decision: its pilots would fly at a minimum 
height of 15,000 feet to reduce their risk from anti-aircraft fire 
essentially to zero, even though that would increase the risk to 
Serbian civilians because it often prevented visual confirmation of 
legitimate military targets. Many would argue that the in bello 
principle of proportionality obliges combatants to take some risk in an 
effort to reduce the risk to enemy civilians.18 If so, the perceived 
legitimacy of NATO’s avowed ad bellum goal, i.e., to halt the 
incipient ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanian Kosovars, influenced 
                                                                                                                                                                         
13. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 406-08 
(1963); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 4-5 (2004); Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 10, § 101, at 10-11 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008).  
14. WALZER, supra note 1, at 21; see also LARRY MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 30 
(2007); Thomas Hurka, Proportionality in the Morality of War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 34, 35 (2005).  
15. Writers often use the phrase “law of war” ambiguously to refer to either or both the jus ad 
bellum and the jus in bello. IHL traditionally referred only to that part of the jus in bello that protected 
those rendered hors de combat, but today it typically refers to the jus in bello generally. For convenience 
and clarity, throughout this Article, I will use (1) “law of war” to refer to the entire corpus of 
international law on the use of force; (2) “jus in bello,” “law of armed conflict,” and IHL 
interchangeably to refer to the law governing the conduct of hostilities; and (3) “law on the use of force” 
and “jus ad bellum” interchangeably to refer to the law governing resort to force. 
16. See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 58); BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 
406-08; Lauterpacht, supra note 11, at 215-20.  
17. See, e.g., Hurka, supra note 14, at 44-45; Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 
ETHICS 693 (2004) [hereinafter McMahan, Ethics of Killing]; Jeff McMahan, On the Moral Equality of 
Combatants, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 379-80 (2006) [hereinafter McMahan, Moral Equality]; see also 
Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal Construction of War, 43 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 28 (2004) (arguing that the dualistic axiom is subject to “slippery slopes,” 
which its advocates’ “arguments have always been normatively and logically insufficient to prevent”). 
18. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, Two Kinds of Military Responsibility, in ARGUING ABOUT 
WAR 23, 23-24 (2004). 
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the international ex post appraisal of NATO’s in bello conduct in the 
conflict.19 
 
• After 9/11, the Bush administration launched and prosecuted what it 
described as a “Global War on Terror.” In this war, if it is a war,20 
political elites and their lawyers invoked ad bellum factors—for 
example, the novel nature of the conflict or the enemy and the 
imperative to avoid at any cost another catastrophic terrorist attack—
to justify or excuse in bello violations.21 Both treaties and custom, for 
example, categorically prohibit the in bello tactic of torture. It is 
difficult to dispute that the United States deliberately tortured some 
detainees in its custody. Alberto R. Gonzales also wrote in what has 
become an infamous memorandum that “the war against terrorism is a 
new kind of war,” which “renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations 
on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its 
provisions.” 22  One might recharacterize this assertion in the 
framework of this Article as a suggestion that ad bellum 
considerations may justifiably relax, or even vitiate, what some see as 
anachronistic in bello constraints.23 
 
• In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) considered the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.24 This required it to 
analyze both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The Court 
concluded that the jus in bello generally prohibits nuclear weapons—
with a curious qualification. It could not say “whether the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State 
                                                                                                                                                                         
19. See infra notes 290-314 and accompanying text. 
20. See Sloane, supra note 10, at 446-47 & nn.19-21. I assume for the purposes of this Article 
that some aspects of the so-called “Global War on Terror,” which I have described in earlier work as an 
“imprecise, unhelpful, and often counterproductive” label, nonetheless may lawfully be (and, at times, as 
a matter of policy, perhaps should be) treated within the rubric of war. See id. at 447 & n.21. This debate 
would require a substantial digression, but, in short, I have argued that: 
[T]he distinction between terrorism as crime and terrorism as war is not ultimately 
qualitative. It is, like the question of war itself, something people decide. War has no 
Platonic form. To suggest that as a matter of international law, a terrorist network by 
definition cannot be a party to an armed conflict in the twenty-first century strikes me as 
both inaccurate and anachronistic, although it would be equally implausible and ill-
advised to begin treating all or even most acts of terrorism within the rubric of war.  
Id. at 447 (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). 
21. See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, Book Review, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 241, 244 (2007) (reviewing 
STEVEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS: A GENERAL HISTORY (2005)) (noting Neff’s emphasis 
on “the just war terms in which the ‘war against terrorism’ has been couched,” as well as “that states 
asserting a right to use force against terrorists have rejected the notion of any moral equivalence between 
them and their adversaries”). 
22. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Office of Counsel to 
the President, to George W. Bush, President of the U.S. (Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE 
PAPERS 118, 119 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (regarding application of the 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War to the conflict with Al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban). 
23. See infra notes 341-358 and accompanying text. 
24. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 
(July 8). 
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would be at stake.”25 Again, to recharacterize this statement in the 
framework of this Article: if the ad bellum consequences for one 
party to a conflict become bad enough, a weapon otherwise 
categorically prohibited by the jus in bello might become legal for 
that party, although presumably it would remain illegal for the 
other—unless that other party, too, “a State,” faced an “extreme 
circumstance of self-defence.”  
 
The logic in each of these examples is contrary to the dualistic axiom, 
which insists that in bello constraints apply equally to all parties to a conflict. 
They do not vary based on ad bellum appraisals of the justice, legitimacy, or 
even urgency of one side’s asserted casus belli (cause or justification for 
resort to force). 26  Yet these examples reflect a trend in contemporary 
international law to relax or disregard the dualistic axiom, that is, to allow ad 
bellum considerations to influence and, at times, even to vitiate the jus in 
bello—an outcome that degrades the efficacy of both components of the law 
of war. Recent state practice and some jurisprudence also suggest a related, 
and equally misguided, tendency to collapse the distinct ad bellum and in 
bello proportionality constraints imposed by the law of war. As explained in 
greater detail below, today, in contrast to the pre-U.N. Charter era, all force 
must be doubly proportionate: that is, proportionate relative to both the jus ad 
bellum and the jus in bello.27 Yet, at times, the ICJ has confused, neglected, or 
misapplied the two principles, as have belligerents—again to the detriment of 
the key values and policies that underwrite the contemporary law of war. 
Briefly, ad bellum proportionality asks whether the initial resort to force 
or particular quantum of force used is proportional to the asserted casus 
belli.28 So were one state to invade another in response to, say, an isolated 
naval incident that damaged one of its warships but caused no casualties, that 
would be ad bellum disproportionate.29 In contrast, were that warship to return 
fire in self-defense, or in an effort to deter comparable future strikes, that 
might well be ad bellum proportionate. But in contemporary international law, 
the analysis should not end there. The reciprocal strike must also be in bello 
proportionate, which is a distinct issue. Now the casus belli drops out of the 
analysis. In bello proportionality tries to limit needless suffering in war 
regardless of the ad bellum legitimacy (including ad bellum proportionality) 
of each party’s resort to force. It asks whether each particular strike will cause 
                                                                                                                                                                         
25. Id. at 266. 
26. See infra notes 377-384 and accompanying text. 
27. JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 10-
11 (2004); Greenwood, supra note 11, at 223; see also infra notes 135-153 and accompanying text. 
28. Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 113, 132 (1986) (“[A]cts done in self-defense must not exceed in manner or aim the necessity 
provoking them.”); see also id. at 120 (“Self-defense must not only be necessary but also proportional to 
the offense in its extent, manner, and goal.”). 
29. See Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. 
J. INT’L L. 309, 315 (1989) (describing as grossly disproportionate “the destruction of a city because of a 
single terrorist incident”).  
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civilian harm that “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”30 
The disconnect between international law’s nominal commitment to the 
dualistic axiom and its corollaries, on the one hand, and the frequent elision or 
misconstruction of those principles in practice, on the other, is often not (as 
some may be inclined to think) a mere product of bad faith or of Cicero’s 
maxim inter arma silent leges (amid the arms of war, the laws are silent). It 
also reflects the dualistic axiom’s somewhat paradoxical nature and a failure 
to appreciate its true rationale and practical limits. The end of the Cold War 
and twenty-first-century developments in the nature and law of war—
including, for example, the advent of modern transnational terrorist networks, 
the increasing availability of catastrophic weapons to nonstate actors,31 and 
the “humanization” of international humanitarian law (IHL) 32 —invite a 
reappraisal of the ad bellum-in bello relationship: what is it, and what should 
it be? 
This Article ventures answers to these questions. Given the complexity 
of the field, however, its real aspiration is more modest: to bring these 
questions back into the vigorous contemporary dialogue about the future 
shape of the law of war. For they have been conspicuously—and, I think, 
dangerously—absent from that dialogue. While I defend the dualistic axiom 
against what I see as its often tacit and subtle erosion, I also try to refine and 
clarify it so that it better serves the policies that underwrite it: minimizing 
unauthorized coercion and reducing superfluous suffering in war. Two forms 
of analytic conflation, in particular, afflict the modern law of war: (1) at the 
macro level, conflation of the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello generally, i.e., 
a failure to apply the dualistic axiom properly or at all; and (2) at the micro 
level, conflation of the distinct proportionality constraints imposed by each 
body of law. Both forms of conflation compromise the law’s efficacy relative 
to the evolving nature of twenty-first-century hostilities. The dualistic axiom 
remains indispensable to the law of war. But it cannot be applied 
acontextually—for example, without considering, descriptively, the 
comparative power of the parties, the technology available to each, and the 
nature of the conflict. 
Furthermore, often, and particularly in the context of “supreme 
emergency” arguments,33 conflation may be ascribed in part to a failure to 
appreciate that ad bellum and in bello constraints on war presuppose distinct 
units of value, which correspond roughly to the quintessential distinction 
between classical and contemporary international law: the ad bellum operates 
principally at the level of polities (often, but not always today, states); the in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
30. Protocol Additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 57(2)(a)(iii), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].  
31. See GORDON CORERA, SHOPPING FOR BOMBS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, GLOBAL 
INSECURITY, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE A.Q. KHAN NETWORK 161-64 (2006); MOISÉS NAÍM, 
ILLICIT: HOW SMUGGLERS, TRAFFICKERS, AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 38-64 
(2005). 
32. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 241 
(2000). 
33. See infra notes 195-209 and accompanying text. 
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bello operates principally at the level of individuals. While states and other 
polities may sometimes possess an “associative” value beyond the 
“aggregative” value constituted by the sum of the interests of their 
constituents,34 they should not be romanticized.35 I take for granted a premise 
of liberal political theory: that only human beings, not abstractions like states, 
merit foundational moral weight. That need not prevent ascribing value to 
collectives insofar as they genuinely represent and serve their constituents,36 
but “any rights states have must derive from and concern their citizens.”37 The 
significance of this moral postulate will become clear in the course of the 
argument. 
At the outset, however, I should say that it means that fascist, Marxist, 
and like polities, which ascribe value to collectives qua collectives, will not 
find some of the following arguments persuasive. It is no coincidence, for 
example, that the Soviet Union and North Vietnam argued that the victims of 
aggression need not abide by IHL.38 Yet I doubt that polities of this sort would 
in any event have social, political, or moral (as opposed to solely 
instrumentalist) reasons to conform their initiation and conduct of war to 
international law. Henkin has famously argued that most international law 
“does not address itself principally to ‘criminal elements’ on the one hand or 
to ‘saints’ on the other. . . . The law is aimed principally at the mass in 
between—at those who, while generally law-abiding, might yet be tempted to 
some violations by immediate self-interest.”39 To guide and regulate their 
initiation and conduct of war is the most that the international law of war, too, 
may hope to accomplish. It would be quixotic to suppose otherwise. But the 
point of emphasis is that insofar as the dualistic axiom compels our respect 
today, it is because of postwar international law’s solicitude for the individual 
as the fundamental unit of value—a feature shared by IHL and international 
human rights law. 40  Human rights, not the rights of states or other 
abstractions, underwrite the dualistic axiom.  
Given this postulate, contemporary international law must candidly 
acknowledge consequences of the dualistic axiom that it has tended to elide to 
date. First, it must recognize that, descriptively, discretionary in bello 
judgments—in particular, about in bello proportionality—at times vary 
depending on oft-politicized characterizations of the perceived justice or 
legality of conflicts. That is, they vary, contrary to the dualistic axiom, based 
                                                                                                                                                                         
34. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 
141, 147-49 (Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1987) (1762); see also Michael Walzer, The 
Moral Standing of States, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 217 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985). 
35. See David Luban, The Romance of the Nation-State, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra 
note 34, at 238 [hereinafter Luban, Romance of the Nation-State]; David Luban, Just War and Human 
Rights, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 34, at 208-09 [hereinafter Luban, Just War and Human 
Rights] (“States—patriots and Rousseau to the contrary—are not to be loved, and seldom to be 
trusted.”). But see Walzer, supra note 34; Michael Walzer, The Rights of Political Communities, in 
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 34. 
36. See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995). 
37. Hurka, supra note 14, at 51. 
38. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 247. 
39. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 94 (2d ed. 1979). 
40. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2-10 (1990); Luban, Just War and Human 
Rights, supra note 35; see also W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary 
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 872 (1990).  
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on ad bellum judgments. That does not mean that they should. But they do. 
Despite nominal consensus on the dualistic axiom, international law tends to 
tolerate more incidental civilian harm (“collateral damage”) if the alleged 
casus belli is either (1) widely perceived as legal (for example, a clear and 
unassailable case of self-defense) or (2) formally illegal but still perceived as 
legitimate, meaning that it furthers broadly shared international values: 
preserving minimum order, halting human rights atrocities, and so forth. This 
may explain, in part, why many accepted NATO’s in bello decision to fight a 
zero-casualty aerial war against Serbia to forestall incipient ethnic cleansing 
rather than insist that it take precautions that could have better enabled 
NATO’s fighter pilots to reduce Serbian civilian casualties—but at the price 
of some risk to NATO’s soldiers. 
Second, international law must recognize and respond to the force of 
recent theoretical objections to the dualistic axiom, which suggest that the 
answer to the in bello question “proportional to what?” logically depends on 
an ad bellum judgment about the justice or legality of the conflict. Some 
modern theorists argue that the “military advantage anticipated,”41 to which 
any collateral damage must be in bello proportionate, cannot be hermetically 
divorced from the goods that justify force. Hurka writes, for example, “[i]f 
‘military advantage’ justifies killing civilians, it does so only because of the 
further goods such advantage will lead to, and how much it justifies depends 
on what those goods are.”42 This implies that in bello judgments not only do 
(descriptively) but also must (logically or normatively) depend, at some level 
of abstraction, on precisely the sort of ad bellum judgment that the dualistic 
axiom insists we exclude.  
While the objection is not unassailable even in strict theoretical terms,43 
to adapt Justice Holmes’s maxim, the life of the law of war “has not been 
logic: it has been experience.”44 Even were the dualistic axiom not strictly 
defensible in normative or ethical terms, as a legal convention, it remains 
grounded in experience and an appreciation of the political and moral reality 
of war. Respect for the axiom remains indispensable to IHL in practice and 
almost always serves the goals and values that underwrite it. But those goals 
and values sometimes prove to be in tension with one another. They cannot be 
reduced to a simple formula or justified by a single moral theory; rather, they 
instantiate a complex blend of deontology, teleology, and virtue ethics. 
Military strategists and political elites will, as they already have, increasingly 
confront consequent tensions in IHL, which must be candidly confronted, not 
elided: for example, whether torture, currently prohibited categorically, may 
ever be justified or excused based on a consequentialist analysis; or whether 
the imperative to stop a genocide may ever partially relax the in bello 
proportionality constraint. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
41. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 57(2)(a)(iii). 
42. Hurka, supra note 14, at 45; see also McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 714-
15. 
43. See, e.g., Yitzhak Benbaji, A Defense of the Traditional War Convention, 118 ETHICS 464, 
466 (2008) (arguing, inter alia, that critiques of the traditional war convention mistakenly presuppose a 
Hobbesian rather than Lockean conception of the scope of the right of self-defense). 
44. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap 
Press 1963) (1881). 
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Part II traces the evolution of the dualistic axiom. It did not take hold 
until comparatively late in the history of warfare and remains surprisingly 
tenuous. Part III explains the sources and logic of conflation: how and why the 
axiom may be neglected, misconstrued, or misapplied, degrading the efficacy 
of both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. Part IV then shows how 
conflation infects some international jurisprudence on, and the practice of, 
war. It demonstrates the cost of conflation in terms of the law’s ability to 
coherently promote two paramount policies of contemporary international 
law: minimizing unauthorized coercion and reducing needless suffering. The 
Article concludes by summarizing how geostrategic changes, war’s evolution, 
and technological advances increasingly challenge the dualistic axiom—and 
by trying to clarify the axiom to strengthen its ability to resist those 
developments. In particular, it stresses the need to operationalize and make 
concrete both ad bellum and in bello regulatory strategies in a way that 
belligerents, at least those operating in good faith, may be incentivized to 
adhere to and to regard as feasible in the circumstances of modern war.  
Ultimately, the efficacy and normative force of the international law of 
war is roughly commensurate to its correspondence to the nature and felt 
necessities of warfare. Insofar as conflation obscures the need to refine the 
law of war to adapt to current sociopolitical conditions and to work out 
practicable conceptions of both ad bellum and in bello proportionality, it 
impedes the ability of international law to develop incrementally at both ends 
of the duality. And insofar as the highly diverse participants in modern 
warfare see a growing disconnect between the law and moral reality of war, 
the law may well cease, to that extent, to operate as effectively as it otherwise 
could to serve the policies that underwrite it.  
II. THE HISTORY OF AN AXIOM: INDEPENDENCE OR INTERDEPENDENCE? 
International lawyers and just war theorists alike use the Latin phrases 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello to describe, respectively, the law governing 
resort to force and the law governing the conduct of hostilities. It would be 
inaccurate to distinguish sharply between the historical evolution of these two 
traditions, which overlap and continue to influence each other. But they 
neither can nor should be equated. 45  Just war theory is much older than 
international law. It originated and evolved principally in theological and 
ethical, not legal, terms.46 The law of war developed largely in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. While influenced by just war doctrine, it reflects 
humanist, positivist, and political realist responses to the trauma of modern 
war. That is why the U.N. Charter does not speak of just and unjust wars but 
only of the “scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold 
sorrow to mankind.”47 Both mainstream just war theory and international law, 
however, embrace the dualistic axiom and, in both intellectual traditions, this 
is a surprisingly recent innovation. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
45. See McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 730.  
46. WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 13 (1981); Josef L. 
Kunz, Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 529-30 (1951). 
47. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
2009] The Cost of Conflation 57 
 
A. Evolution of the Dualistic Axiom in Just War Theory 
1. Ancient and Medieval Origins: Interdependence 
The Western concept of bellum justum (just war) originated in the early 
Roman era,48 at which time it had principally a procedural meaning: a war 
“preceded by a solemn action taken by the collegium fetialium, a corporation 
of special priests, the fetiales,” who would certify to the senate under oath that 
“a foreign nation had violated its duty toward the Romans” and thereby 
created a just cause for war.49 Roman law did not include a distinct jus in 
bello. 50  Within ad bellum limits, wars were “essentially unrestrained. 
Prisoners could be enslaved or massacred; plunder was general; and no 
distinction was recognized between combatants and noncombatants.”51 Hence 
theologians would later refer to ethically unregulated warfare, which 
justifiably could be waged against infidels, as bellum Romanum. 
Yet Augustine, the progenitor of theological just war doctrine, likewise 
said almost nothing about in bello issues.52 He integrated Christian virtues of 
patience and pacificism with the inherited just war theory of ancient Rome,53 
yielding a substantive conception of just war in contrast to the largely 
procedural one of Roman law.54 But insofar as he spoke to issues that might 
today fall within the jus in bello rubric, his admonitions were not independent 
of, but intertwined with, the jus ad bellum. In Augustine’s view, only God’s 
clear command (as depicted, for example, in the Israelite wars of the Old 
Testament) could offer reliable assurance of the just nature of a war. 
Consequently, constraints on the conduct of hostilities were simply the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
48. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 63 (4th ed. 2005). Jus ad 
bellum antecedents exist in the writings of classical Greece, the Hebrew Bible, and elsewhere, but until 
ancient Rome, none of these can be described accurately as an ethical concept, still less a legal one, of 
bellum justum. See BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 3-4; ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE 
LAW OF NATIONS 9-11, 15 (1947) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY]; G.I.A.D. Draper, 
Grotius’ Place in the Development of Legal Ideas About War, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 177, 177 (Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts eds., 1990); Arthur Nussbaum, 
Just War—A Legal Concept?, 42 MICH. L. REV. 453, 453-54 (1943) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Just War]. 
49. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 454; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 4; 
Draper, supra note 48, at 178-79; Joachim von Elbe, The Evolution of the Concept of the Just War in 
International Law, 33 AM. J. INT’L L. 665, 666 (1939). 
50. In bello, like ad bellum, antecedents can be found throughout ancient civilizations. See 
Deuteronomy 20:10-20; L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 20-23 (2d ed. 
2001); THE LAW CODE OF MANU 113 (Patrick Olivelle ed. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2004); 
NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 15; SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 26 (Cheng Lin trans., 
Confucius Publishing Co. 1970) (ca. 510 B.C.); Josiah Ober, Classical Greek Times, in THE LAWS OF 
WAR 12 (Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994); Surya P. Subedi, 
The Concept in Hinduism of ‘Just War’, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 339, 354-57 (2003). 
51. Robert C. Stacey, The Age of Chivalry, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 50, at 27, 27. 
The same concept prevailed in classical Greek thought: restraints against, for example, enslavement, did 
not apply in wars against (non-Greek) “barbarians.” See, e.g., PLATO, THE REPUBLIC § 469(b)-(c), at 144 
(C.D.C. Reeve ed., G.M.A. Grube trans., 1992) (ca. 380 B.C.). 
52. JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR 123 (1981); 
Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 391, 395 & 
n.23 (1993). 
53. See FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 16 (1975); see also 
Draper, supra note 48, at 180; Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 455.  
54. See von Elbe, supra note 49, at 668; see also RUSSELL, supra note 53, at 16-39; Kunz, 
supra note 46, at 530.  
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“inevitable consequences of lack of absolute certainty such as God alone can 
give.”55 Augustine did, however, preach mercy, and he recognized, if only as 
a prudential matter, that wars fought without it could endanger the stability of 
any future peace—the ultimate goal, in his view, of any war.56 
Aquinas, the principal medieval scholastic who systematically codified 
and expanded Augustinian just war doctrine,57 likewise did not develop a 
distinct jus in bello. Although he condemned the deliberate slaughter of 
noncombatants,58 this and other scattered theological antecedents did not add 
up to a coherent conception of jus in bello as a set of legal or ethical 
injunctions.59  Again, insofar as a theological analogue to the jus in bello 
existed,60 it remained parasitic on the jus ad bellum. Hence, for Aquinas, too, 
“the justness of the resort to war determined to a large extent the limits on the 
conduct of war; that is, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello were 
interdependent.”61 In general, in the theological, as in the Roman, tradition, a 
just cause authorized any means of war, however brutal. 62  Conversely, 
soldiers who fought in unjust wars were, for that reason alone, deemed 
criminals—even if they refrained from atrocities such as plunder, rape, and 
massacre.63 
Restraints on the conduct of hostilities chiefly evolved as a part of 
chivalry, a largely secular tradition.64 As the means of warfare grew more 
sophisticated in the Middle Ages, medieval war ordinances and customary 
codes evolved for knights inter se, 65  which, although often violated in 
practice, presaged the later emergence of a distinct jus in bello.66 Yet restraints 
                                                                                                                                                                         
55. JOHNSON, supra note 52, at xxx. 
56. AUGUSTINE, POLITICAL WRITINGS 3-12 (Ernest L. Fortin & Douglas Kries eds., Michael 
W. Tkacz & Douglas Kries trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994) (ca. 410 A.D.); see also NUSSBAUM, 
CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 41. 
57. See Draper, supra note 48, at 181; James Turner Johnson, The Just War Idea: The State of 
the Question, 23 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 167, 177 (2006); Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 456-57. 
Alexander of Hales, Gratian, and other theologians who contributed to the evolution of Christian just 
war theory, see BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 6 & n.4; von Elbe, supra note 49, at 669-70, likewise did 
not develop a distinct jus in bello, see Stacey, supra note 51, at 30-31. 
58. John Finnis, The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition, in THE 
ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 26 (Terry Nardin ed., 1996); see also NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra 
note 48, at 44.  
59. See Stacey, supra note 51, at 30-31; see also JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 124-50; 
MAURICE H. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 189-90 (1965). 
60. Strictly, according to James Turner Johnson, “it is incorrect to speak of classical just war 
before 1500.” Before that time, “there exist[ed] two doctrines, a religious (i.e., theological and 
canonical) one largely limited to the right to make war (jus ad bellum) and a secular one whose almost 
total content related to the proper mode of fighting (Law of Arms, jus in bello).” JAMES TURNER 
JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR 8 (1975). 
61. Gardam, supra note 52, at 395; see also Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the 
Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 366 (1953). 
62. See Gardam, supra note 52, at 395. Moreover, “just war could legitimize criminal acts and 
create a legal title to goods whose taking in other circumstances would be considered robbery.” 
THEODOR MERON, Shakespeare’s Henry the Fifth and the Laws of War, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF 
AGE 11, 22 (1998); see also Draper, supra note 48, at 182. 
63. Leon Friedman, Introduction to 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3, 10-11 
(Leon Friedman ed., 1972); cf. Draper, supra note 48, at 182-83. 
64. See GREEN, supra note 50, at 23-25; Stacey, supra note 51, at 30-38. 
65. See THEODOR MERON, Medieval and Renaissance Ordinances of War: Codifying 
Discipline and Humanity, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE, supra note 62, at 1. 
66. Draper, supra note 48, at 185; see also Michael Howard, Temperamenta Belli: Can War 
Be Controlled?, in RESTRAINTS ON WAR 5 (Michael Howard ed., 1979). By the end of the Middle Ages,  
2009] The Cost of Conflation 59 
 
on war applied only to Christian knights67 (hence the extraordinary brutality 
of the Crusades), and the ad bellum criterion of “public authority” continued 
to determine rights and privileges in war, for example, to collect ransom or 
seize booty.68 In short, the incipient jus in bello remained bound up with 
highly particularistic conceptions about the propriety of both the warrior and 
the war. The idea that the jus in bello should apply equally to belligerents 
remained largely foreign to medieval thought, secular and religious alike. In 
fact, the jus ad bellum largely determined the jus in bello, insofar as the latter 
existed. 
2. The Scholastics: Can a War Be Just on Both Sides? 
Not coincidentally, the dualistic axiom’s origins roughly coincide with 
the emergence of international law in the decades surrounding the Peace of 
Westphalia. The problem that led to its evolution is a familiar one that persists 
today: invariably, each party to war claims the mantle of justice for itself and 
denies it to the other.69 In the emergent era of decentralized authority, with 
power dispersed among multiple sovereigns—as opposed to the previous 
(notionally) uniform authority of the Holy Roman Empire and the Pope—no 
single sovereign could be the arbiter of the justice of conflicts among them.70 
Consequently, even before Grotius, who often receives principal credit for 
developing the dualistic axiom, 71  thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria, 
Francisco Suárez, and Alberico Gentili began to elaborate justifications for the 
equal application of the jus in bello to just and unjust belligerents alike.72 
Vitoria, for example, whose views largely reflect those of the later 
scholastics, explicitly distinguished the categories of jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello for the first time,73 a precondition of the dualistic axiom. He denied that 
any war could be objectively “just on both sides,” where objective means “in 
the sight of God.”74 But he recognized that because of human ignorance, 
mistake, or uncertainty about the divine will (a problem raised by Augustine a 
millennium before), all belligerents would often believe, in good faith, in the 
justice of their casus belli. Situations would therefore arise in which a “war 
may be just in itself for the side which has true justice on its side, and also 
[apparently] just for the other side, because they wage war in good faith and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
[t]he jus in bello included two major elements: a listing of classes of persons who 
normally, by reason of their personal characteristics . . . or social function, were to be 
regarded as noncombatants and not to be directly, intentionally attacked during a just 
war; and some rather moribund efforts to define certain means of war as impermissible 
because of their inherently indiscriminate or disproportionate effects. 
Johnson, supra note 57, at 169. 
67. JOHNSON, supra note 52, at xxiii, 128-29; see also Draper, supra note 48, at 184-85; 
Stacey, supra note 51, at 28, 30, 33.  
68. Stacey, supra note 51, at 31-32; see also KEEN, supra note 59, at 137-85. 
69. Gardam, supra note 52, at 392-94. 
70. See DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 66 (4th ed. 2005); see also BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 
11. 
71. Gardam, supra note 52, at 396 & n.29. 
72. E.g., THEODOR MERON, Common Rights of Mankind in Gentili, Grotius, and Suárez, in 
WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE, supra note 62, at 122. 
73. JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 175. 
74. JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 194. 
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are hence excused from sin.”75 In short, epistemic uncertainty about God’s 
will supplied the initial rationale for the dualistic axiom. 
3. Natural Law: The Birth of Secular Just War Doctrine 
Until Gentili, however, who receives general credit for “ridding 
international law of the shackles of theology,”76 the dualistic axiom lacked a 
real secular foundation. Against the scholastic view, Gentili argued from a 
natural law perspective that war could be objectively just on both sides (not 
only apparently so because of one belligerent’s mistake). 77  He also 
reconceptualized noncombatant immunity. Rather than base it on the supposed 
innocence of certain classes relative to war’s causes, he stressed humanitarian 
ideals that more closely approximate those of modern IHL78 and drew “a clear 
line of demarcation between the legal aspects of the war problem on the one 
hand, [and] theology and ethics on the other.”79 
Grotius brought these disparate strands of thought together in his 
magisterial work De Jure Belli ac Pacis. First, echoing the scholastics (and, 
for that matter, the Socratic view that man does evil only because of 
ignorance), he argued that while, in principle, “[w]ar cannot be just on both 
Sides, . . . because the very Nature of the Thing does not permit one to have a 
moral Power, or true Right, to two contrary Things, as suppose to do a Thing, 
and to hinder the doing of it,” still, “it may happen that neither of the Parties 
in War acts unjustly. For no man acts unjustly, but he who is conscious that 
what he does is unjust; and this is what many are ignorant of.”80 Second, 
echoing Gentili, he argued from a secular (natural law) rather than a 
theological perspective that certain restraints should apply equally to all 
combatants.81 These included the ethical admonition that noncombatants (for 
example, women, children, the elderly, farmers, clergy, and merchants), as 
                                                                                                                                                                         
75. FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, POLITICAL WRITINGS 312-13 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy 
Lawrance eds., 1991) (emphasis omitted); see also JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 155; Nussbaum, Just 
War, supra note 48, at 460. Suárez elaborated similar views. He rejected the idea of excusable ignorance 
but recommended that, should both belligerents claim to be fighting justly, they submit to arbitration. 
See 2 FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, On War (Disp. XIII), in SELECTIONS FROM THREE WORKS 815-16 (James 
Brown Scott ed., Gwladys L. Williams, Ammi Brown & John Waldron trans., Clarendon Press 1944) 
(1621); see also JOHNSON, supra note 60, at 194; NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 69. 
76. NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 79; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 
11; Draper, supra note 48, at 190.  
77. 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRE TRES [THE THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF 
WAR] 31-32 (James Brown Scott ed., John C. Rolfe trans., Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace 1933) 
(1612); see RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 31 (1999). Gentili also recognized 
gradations of justice in war: at times, “war is just on one side, but on the other is still more just.” 2 
GENTILI, supra, at 33. In the context of the post-9/11 preoccupation with preventive (or preemptive) war, 
animated substantially by the 2002 National Security Strategy and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which is 
widely (though incorrectly) believed to have been justified on that basis, it is worth mentioning one 
reason for Gentili’s belief that a war could be just on both sides: in cases of preventive war, where two 
sides threatened each other, Gentili believed that each might be justified in striking first. The other could 
then justifiably respond in defense. I am grateful to David Luban for calling my attention to this point.  
78. See Draper, supra note 48, at 190. 
79. Von Elbe, supra note 49, at 677. 
80. 2 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1130; see also id. at 1131. 
81. E.g., 3 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1420-21; see also JOHNSON, supra note 52, at 178-79; 
G.I.A.D. Draper, The Development of International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 
OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 67, 67 (1988). 
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well as combatants who requested quarter, be spared unless found guilty of a 
crime.82  
It is in this latter regard that Grotius’s strongest contribution to modern 
IHL emerges. He elaborated the idea of temperamenta belli, moderation in 
war, to which the third book of his treatise is largely devoted. Far more than 
his predecessors, he stressed humanitarian constraints on war—even if in 
moral, not strictly legal, terms,83 for Grotius regarded international law, such 
as it existed then, as permissive in this respect.84 Yet by looking to state 
practice for evidence of natural law, which he found in man’s social nature 
rather than the divine will,85 he facilitated a critical transition from theological 
just war theory (expounded mainly by the scholastics) to what would, 
centuries later, be reformulated as IHL (expounded mainly by international 
lawyers, statesmen, and secular humanists).86  
4. Positivism: Just War as Positive Morality 
Yet if Grotius and Gentili marked the birth of secular just war theory and 
an early entreaty for the dualistic axiom, their work also reflected the new 
paradigm of the law of nations, which culminated in its virtually simultaneous 
demise. Divorced from religious foundations and transposed to a world of 
states competing for power and influence, just war doctrine rapidly 
degenerated into what John Austin would deride as “positive morality.”87 The 
view of Gentili and Grotius—that a war could be just for both belligerents—
ironically “brought the just war doctrine in international law to a cul-de-
sac.”88 For states invariably justified resort to hostilities in just war terms, but 
no neutral arbiter, even in theory, existed, rendering the doctrine even more 
manipulable and almost entirely ineffective as restraint on the use of war as 
tool of statecraft.89 
Positivism, which gradually displaced natural law as the reigning 
methodology of international law, therefore explicitly relegated just war 
doctrine to the domain of ethics rather than law. 90  Hence, in his highly 
                                                                                                                                                                         
82. See 3 GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 1439-51. 
83. NUSSBAUM, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 48, at 106-07. The distinction between the two 
was not, at the time, anywhere near as sharp as in contemporary legal positivism, however. 
84. See Draper, supra note 48, at 198. 
85. Because Grotius “proceeded on the assumption that the practices of contemporary states 
were not improper deviations from a theological norm, but expressions of a natural order whose 
principles he could determine,” Friedman, supra note 63, at 15, he “claimed in earnest that the law of 
nature and international law derived therefrom could subsist without a divine foundation.” Nussbaum, 
Just War, supra note 48, at 466. Furthermore, “by taking a pragmatic, positivistic approach, Grotius 
could reach both the Catholic princes and the Protestant rulers then engaged in the bitter battles of the 
Thirty Years War (1618-1648).” Friedman, supra note 63, at 15; see also Hedley Bull, The Importance 
of Grotius, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 48, at 65, 78. 
86. See Draper, supra note 81, at 67-68. 
87. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 19-20 (Wilfrid E. Rumble 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832); see also Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 469-71.  
88. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 66-67. 
89. See id.; see also MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 134 (1961) (“The absence of an effective central authority enabled each 
belligerent to be, in effect, his own and final judge . . . .”). 
90. Von Elbe, supra note 49, at 682 (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 380 
(Edward D. Ingram ed., Joseph Chitty trans., 1857) (1758)). 
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influential treatise The Law of Nations, Emer de Vattel begins his analysis of 
war by stressing “the necessary law of nations, or of the law of nature”91 and, 
by reference to it, denouncing unjust wars.92 But after characterizing natural 
law as “the inviolable rule that each [nation] ought conscientiously to 
follow,” 93  Vattel explains why, as Nussbaum would later write, just war 
doctrine “fades entirely as soon as it is severed from its fostering soil, 
religion”94: 
But in the contests of nations and sovereigns who live together in a state of nature, how 
can this rule [that “[h]e alone whom justice and necessity have armed, has a right to make 
war”] be enforced? They acknowledge no superior. Who then shall be judge between 
them, to assign to each his rights and obligations—to say to the one, “You have a right to 
take up arms, to attack your enemy, and subdue him by force,”—and to the other, “Every 
act of hostility that you commit will be an act of injustice; your victories will be so many 
murders, your conquests rapines and robberies?”95 
For this reason, after initially extolling natural law injunctions, Vattel 
dismissed them and recommended instead a focus on the “voluntary law of 
nations,” which, he argued, aimed to secure the common advantage of states.96  
The voluntary law of nations, however, did not prohibit war. Nor, for 
Vattel, should it, for “warfare which would be illegal on one side and 
therefore outside the law would create chaotic conditions,” culminating in the 
opposite of Immanuel Kant’s idealistic vision of perpetual peace, 97  i.e., 
perpetual war. Any peace, Vattel worried, would be only temporary were 
postwar reconfigurations of power subject to legal challenge.98 While Vattel 
nominally embraced the dualistic axiom,99  one may question its value or 
meaning given the virtual absence of constraints on war during this era. In 
positive international law, war became just another tool of statecraft, to be 
deployed for any reason or no reason at the sovereign’s discretion. 
After World War I, some international lawyers sought to revive just war 
doctrine as a framework for a reinvigorated law of war. Their efforts failed 
dismally. By then, Christianity had become an untenable foundation for an 
aspirationally universal international law, which sought to bind states with 
diverse religious mores. But except for the residual influence of chivalry, the 
just war tradition lacked a secular foundation. 100  Given this history, it is 
curious that when just war theory enjoyed an intellectual revival in the latter 
half of the twentieth century,101 theorists treated the dualistic axiom as an 
entrenched part of that intellectual tradition. In fact, the idea that restraints on 
                                                                                                                                                                         
91. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 188, at 589 (Béla Kapossy & Richard 
Whatmore eds., Thomas Nugent trans., 2008) (1758).  
92. See id. §§ 183-84, at 586. 
93. Id. § 188, at 589 (emphasis added).  
94. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 475.  
95. VATTEL, supra note 91, § 188, at 589; see also Sassòli, supra note 11, at 243. 
96. VATTEL, supra note 91, § 189, at 590. 
97. IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE (Lewis White Beck ed., Liberal Arts Press 1957) 
(1795).  
98. Von Elbe, supra note 49, at 683; see VATTEL, supra note 91, § 190, at 591. 
99. VATTEL, supra note 91, § 191, at 591. 
100. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 475; see also von Elbe, supra note 49, at 687; 
Kunz, supra note 46, at 529. 
101. See Johnson, supra note 57, at 172-80. 
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the conduct of hostilities should apply equally to all belligerents, whatever 
their casus belli, emerged late in the evolution of just war doctrine and never 
acquired the axiomatic character that it now enjoys. 
B. Evolution of the Dualistic Axiom in International Law 
1. War as a Metajuristic Phenomenon 
Vitoria, Suárez, Gentili, Grotius, and others of lesser repute integrated 
just war theory into what would become the public law of Europe and, in time, 
international law.102 It would be artificial in this regard to treat the modern law 
of war as distinct from its theological and natural law roots. Yet the evolution 
of the dualistic axiom in international law is in a sense the mirror image of its 
evolution in the just war tradition. Just war theory focused first and foremost 
on the jus ad bellum and only latterly on the jus in bello; international law 
largely abandoned any pretense to a jus ad bellum until the advent of the U.N. 
Charter in 1945 and focused foremost on the jus in bello—for “[w]ar being 
legal and inevitable, no other task was to be performed by States than that of 
making humanitarian rules regarding the conduct of hostilities.”103 
This process began in earnest in the nineteenth century. The rise of IHL 
dates to several milestones in the latter half of that century: when Henri 
Dunant witnessed the Battle of Solferino (1859) and then founded the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1864);104 when, during the 
Civil War, Francis Lieber wrote and President Lincoln promulgated the 
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
(1863);105 and when states drafted the first Geneva Convention (1864) and the 
St. Petersburg Declaration (1868). 106  These and subsequent developments 
shaped an early jus in bello that viewed war as a “metajuristic phenomenon,” 
an inevitable if tragic fact of life, “extra-legal rather than illegal.”107 The idea 
of just war—insofar as it had ever been understood in legal rather than 
religious or ethical terms—virtually vanished with the rise of the modern 
nation-state. The “liberum jus ad bellum, the right of the absolute sovereign to 
                                                                                                                                                                         
102. Cf. Benedetto Conforti, The Doctrine of “Just War” and Contemporary International 
Law, 2002 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 3, 5 (describing Vitoria as “half theologian and half lawyer or, better, a 
kind of bridge between medieval scholars and the founders of the modern science of international law”).  
103. Id. at 3; see also Arnold D. McNair, Collective Security, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 150, 151 
(1936) (quoting WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (J.B. Atlay ed., 5th 
ed. 1904)).  
104. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR’S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN 
CONSCIENCE 109-63 (1998) (tracing the founding and evolution of the ICRC). 
105. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General 
Orders No. 100 (Apr. 24, 1863) (“Lieber Code”), reprinted in 1 THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 63. The Lieber Code did not purport to be declaratory of international law; it 
applied only to the Union’s forces during the Civil War. But it inspired comparable codes in Europe and 
elsewhere. GREEN, supra note 50, at 29-30. 
106. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 
Aug. 22, 1864, 22 Stat. 940, 129 Consol. T.S. 361; Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War, of 
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29-Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau 
Recueil (ser. 1) 474, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 95 (Supp. 1907). 
107. McNair, supra note 103, at 150, 152; see also id. at 150-51 (citing jurists such as Brierly, 
Hall, Westlake, and Oppenheim to the same effect). 
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initiate war for reasons of state,”108 displaced the theological jus ad bellum. 
States continued to justify their wars with just war rhetoric.109 But until the 
post-World War I era,110 international law regarded resort to war as a liberty 
of states, unregulated by law. 111  This liberty, combined with a new 
humanitarian ethos, supplied a new—and very different—rationale for the 
equal application of the jus in bello to all belligerents than the old theological 
(empirical) anxiety about the divine will.112  
The dualistic axiom’s emergence in classical international law therefore 
differs significantly from its evolution in the just war tradition. In short, 
because international law imposed no restraint on resort to war, the jus in 
bello logically could not depend on any jus ad bellum: no such body of law 
existed. That is why treaties codifying the jus in bello did not refer to the 
justice or legality of war, only to mitigating its hardships.113 To this day, the 
idea that animates the jus in bello, embodied in the ICRC’s ethos, is that 
“human suffering is human suffering, whether incurred in the course of a ‘just 
war’ or not. . . . Humanity, not Justice, is its prime concern.”114 
2. From Bellum Justum to Bellum Legale 
As late as 1943, international lawyers continued to describe resort to war 
as “a metajuristic phenomenon, an event outside the range and control of the 
law.”115 War simply modified “the status of the belligerents, and, to a certain 
extent, the status of third powers,” replacing the law of peace with that of 
war. 116  Yet two years later, after the most brutal and destructive war in 
Western history, they sought to subject this metajuristic phenomenon to law—
but emphatically not in just war terms. While the advent of the U.N. Charter 
(which prohibits, with two exceptions,117 any resort to force118) established a 
new jus ad bellum, it did not clarify whether and, if so, how the jus in bello 
would change commensurately.119 Nothing in the Charter’s language speaks to 
the relationship between the new jus ad bellum and the inherited jus in bello—
                                                                                                                                                                         
108. Johnson, supra note 57, at 170; see also von Elbe, supra note 49, at 684; Gardam, supra 
note 52, at 396.  
109. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 14; DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 67. 
110. The League of Nations Covenant contained antecedents to the effort to outlaw war, but the 
principle received its first authoritative enunciation in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, General Treaty for 
Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
111. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 67; see also 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 114-15 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002). The Hague Convention (III) of 1907 
introduced certain formal requirements—for example, that hostilities be preceded by a declaration of 
war and that neutral powers notified promptly—but did not purport to deny states the absolute right to 
engage in hostilities as a tool of statecraft. Hague Convention (III) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2259, 205 Consol. T.S. 263. 
112. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 156; Greenwood, supra note 11, at 225.  
113. E.g., Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War pmbl., July 27, 1929, 47 
Stat. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343; Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land pmbl., Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277; Hague Convention (II) with Respect to 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 187 Consol. T.S. 429. 
114. GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 4-5 (1980). 
115. Nussbaum, Just War, supra note 48, at 477. 
116. Id.; von Elbe, supra note 49, at 684. 
117. U.N. Charter arts. 42 (Security Council enforcement), 51 (self-defense). 
118. Id. art. 2, para. 4. 
119. Greenwood, supra note 11, at 225. 
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except, perhaps, insofar as its preamble and scattered references to human 
rights or dignity elsewhere in the Charter120 may be read to reinforce the 
humanitarian ethos of the extant jus in bello and so to imply that IHL should 
remain applicable equally to all belligerents, whatever their ad bellum status.  
Common Articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 affirmed 
that the jus in bello codified in those treaties applied in “all circumstances” 
and to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict.”121 But this 
did not resolve how it applied. It did not resolve, for example, the question 
whether customary principles of military necessity and proportionality—or 
treaty prohibitions on poison weapons, expanding bullets, and the like—
should apply equally were one U.N. member state illegally to invade another 
(in breach of Article 2(4)), and the invaded state legally to respond in self-
defense (under Article 51). Nor did it resolve whether the jus in bello should 
apply equally to force authorized by the Security Council. It would be at least 
plausible to say, as some indeed did at that time, that for an aggressor 
violating Article 2(4) of the Charter, no amount of force could be necessary or 
proportional. These principles require a lawful military objective relative to 
which they can be applied:122 Necessary for what? Proportional to what? If an 
aggressor lacks the right to use any force, then how can a particular quantum 
of force be lawful? 
Protocol I offers another, and the most unequivocal, textual basis for the 
dualistic axiom. For states parties, at least, the Conventions and “th[e] 
Protocol must be fully applied in all circumstances to all persons who are 
protected by those instruments, without any adverse distinction based on the 
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or 
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.”123 Yet Article 1(4) confers in bello 
belligerent rights on some, but not all, nonstate belligerents, namely, peoples 
“fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist 
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination.” Many decried this 
proviso for, in their view, effectively reintroducing into the law the discredited 
distinction between just and unjust wars. 124  It thereby cast at least some 
arguable doubt on Protocol I’s otherwise categorical affirmation of the 
dualistic axiom. 125  Protocol II also confirmed the historical asymmetry 
between state and nonstate combatants. It retained international law’s 
traditional prohibition on “private armies” 126  and did not offer combatant 
                                                                                                                                                                         
120. See, e.g., U.N. Charter pmbl.; id. art. 1, para. 3; id. art. 55(c). 
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immunity to those fighting on behalf of nonstate belligerents in internal 
conflicts.127 
Yet in modern IHL, the dualistic axiom does not depend on these textual 
references; it is rather, or so many argue, custom.128 If it is custom, however, 
then, like the prohibition on official torture, it may well be custom despite, 
rather than because of, state practice.129 It is difficult to appraise any war 
honestly without recognizing that international lawyers, not to mention 
belligerents, appraise the conduct of hostilities differently depending on each 
side’s avowed casus belli. Participants at different levels of the international 
legal process express divergent views on the correct application of the jus in 
bello, and those views frequently seem to reflect their perceptions of the 
legality or justice of particular conflicts.130  
Lawful or just belligerents, for example, however they may be defined in 
context, tend to receive more deference in their application of in bello 
proportionality than do unlawful or unjust ones.131 NATO’s aerial war against 
Serbia may well be a case in point. The decision to fly at a minimum height of 
15,000 feet so as to guarantee that NATO would suffer no casualties 
contributed to the death of about five hundred Serbian civilians and devastated 
Serbia’s infrastructure.132 Would the ex post appraisal of NATO’s decision 
have differed had its ad bellum goal been to conquer and colonize Serbia 
rather than to halt the incipient ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars? Or 
consider the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon: each side 
confidently justified its conduct of hostilities and accused the other of 
proportionality violations—although neither seemed to know whether they 
meant ad bellum or in bello.133 Finally, consider how perceptions of justice, 
and the stark contrast between good and evil in the Second World War, 
affected ex post appraisals of Allied carpet bombing of German and Japanese 
cities, including the fire bombing of Dresden and the atomic destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  
Nevertheless, no state today expresses the view that the justice of its 
casus belli (or the injustice of its opponent’s) relieves it of or even relaxes its 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Michael Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 
(1973). 
127. Protocol II does not authorize private armies, comprised of nonstate combatants, to engage 
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128. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 407 (collecting state practice); see also DINSTEIN, supra note 
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130. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 257-58.  
131. See Gardam, supra note 52, at 392-93, 412. For a detailed analysis of how ad bellum 
perceptions shaped in bello conduct in the 1991 Gulf War, see Judith G. Gardam, Noncombatant 
Immunity and the Gulf Conflict, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 813 (1992). 
132. See infra notes 290-300 and accompanying text. 
133. See infra notes 315-327 and accompanying text. 
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in bello obligations. Just as the persistence of official torture in state practice 
does not necessarily defeat the conclusion that it violates customary 
international law,134 so the dualistic axiom may well remain custom despite 
not infrequent incidents of arguably inconsistent state practice. The critical 
question is why this custom exists—and how to understand and apply it in an 
era in which neither theological doubt nor the absence of a jus ad bellum 
supplies its rationale. 
C. The Ad Bellum-In Bello Relationship in the Charter Era 
A common but mistaken view of the contemporary relationship between 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello is that ad bellum judgments precede and operate 
in a sphere analytically distinct from in bello judgments. Once hostilities 
begin, belligerents cross a kind of legal Rubicon separating the spheres of war 
and peace: thereafter, “ius ad bellum ceases to be relevant and ius in bello 
takes control.”135 And whatever the ad bellum legality of the initial resort to 
armed force, particular acts must then be judged solely by the jus in bello, 
which applies uniformly to all belligerents. Yet this view, which arguably 
made sense for so long as no genuine jus ad bellum existed, is now 
anachronistic.136 Contemporary state practice belies the traditional assumption 
of a “sharp distinction between peace and war.”137 In fact, a sharp distinction 
probably never existed; only intermittent and fluctuating levels of conflict did. 
But given the increase in low-intensity conflicts, civil wars, transnational 
terrorism, insurgencies, and other organized violence by nonstate belligerents, 
this observation applies a fortiori in the twenty-first century. 
The U.N. Charter’s introduction of a positive jus ad bellum broke down 
the formerly distinct legal spheres of war and peace such that ad bellum and in 
bello principles now can, and often should, operate concurrently.138 Any use 
of force must be necessary and proportional relative to both the jus ad bellum 
and the jus in bello.139 The in bello concepts of necessity and proportionality 
have ad bellum analogues—with quite distinct meanings. During the 1991 
Iraq War, for example, coalition forces sought 
to isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime. . . . The legitimacy of this objective . . . is a 
matter for the proportionality equation in ius ad bellum. The detailed conduct of the 
attacks on [particular] targets is a matter for the proportionality equation in IHL, and in 
the case of the Persian Gulf conflict was worked out frequently on a daily basis. The 
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supra note 11, at 223. 
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timing and level of command at which the decisions are made in ius ad bellum and IHL 
respectively, therefore, will differ.140 
Even more generally, the jus ad bellum now applies not only to the initial 
decision to resort to force but also to all conduct “involving the use of force 
which occurs during the course of hostilities.” That conduct must be necessary 
and proportionate to the casus belli.141 
This proposition need not, as some argue, lead to absurdly or unduly 
restrictive constraints, for example, “that a state which has been the object of 
an illegal attack can never take the initiative or that its forces may only fire if 
fired upon”142—although, as we will see below, this position appears to be 
precisely what the ICJ implied in its Oil Platforms judgment.143 Instead, the 
proper referent of ad bellum proportionality changes with the nature and 
scope of the conflict. Initially, perhaps, defensive force must be ad bellum 
proportionate to the injury inflicted. But in any sustained conflict, a state may, 
and at some stage perforce will, cease to calculate ad bellum proportionality 
by reference to the “injury received” and instead consider “the object 
legitimately to be achieved.”144 Ad bellum proportionality generally tries to 
minimize unauthorized force by requiring states to use no more than necessary 
for self-defense.145 But, realistically, in any sustained conflict, the effect of ad 
bellum proportionality as a genuine constraint on force will diminish as the 
objectives of that force multiply and expand.146 
Furthermore, “sustained” can no longer be understood to refer solely to 
prolonged interstate wars. Perhaps the paramount question for the 
contemporary jus ad bellum is under what circumstances an accumulation of 
discrete attacks by nonstate belligerents operating from a host state—even if 
no one of these attacks would, in isolation, justify force against that state—
may in the aggregate be deemed an “armed attack” under Article 51 of the 
U.N. Charter, giving rise to a right of self-defense. Suppose, for example, that 
the United States responded to al-Qaeda’s attack on the U.S.S. Cole by 
invading Afghanistan. Doubtless that would have been an ad bellum violation: 
it would have been ad bellum disproportionate to the injury received. But few 
would deny that the Cole’s bombing generated some right to engage in 
proportionate self-defense. In contrast, the invasion of Afghanistan and ouster 
of the Taliban in response to the far more severe attacks of 9/11, especially in 
combination with a history of previous strikes by al-Qaeda, were 
overwhelmingly regarded as lawful despite their formal noncompliance with 
the positive jus ad bellum.147 Al-Qaeda’s attacks could not be attributed to 
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Afghanistan under the law of state responsibility,148 and the Taliban did not 
exercise effective control over al-Qaeda. 149  Still, the Security Council, 
regional organizations, and many foreign states explicitly supported the U.S. 
response, strongly implying that they viewed it as lawful.150 As this example 
suggests, ad bellum proportionality must be appraised contextually.  
Yet despite the postwar effort to subject war to law, the jus ad bellum 
remains, as it has been historically, manipulable and often highly 
politicized.151 In contrast, the jus in bello, including in bello proportionality, 
strives to remain agnostic about the architectural goals of war. It insists that 
each strike be proportionate in that it not inflict excessive civilian harm 
relative to the concrete military advantage sought by the particular attack.152 
Of course, this is easy to state abstractly but notoriously difficult to apply.153 
IHL, as explored below, urgently needs to develop the concrete details of in 
bello proportionality. The point of emphasis here is that, today, in contrast to 
the prewar era, both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello apply concurrently 
throughout an armed conflict—and this creates circumstances rife with the 
potential for conflation of these distinct bodies of law. 
III. THE SOURCES AND LOGIC OF CONFLATION 
The concurrent operation of the jus ad bellum and jus in bello can lead 
to at least three forms of ad bellum-in bello conflation, which may initially 
appear logical: (1) an aggressor-defender model of war, which denies the 
dualistic axiom by reference to the maxim ex injuria jus non oritur (a right 
may not arise from an illegal act); (2) allowing ad bellum proportionality to 
influence its in bello analogue; and (3) vitiating the dualistic axiom in 
circumstances of perceived national crisis—what the literature denotes 
“supreme emergency.”154 Despite international law’s embrace of the dualistic 
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crisis/RC.24e.htm. 
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axiom, these forms of conflation challenge its vitality at an abstract level—
with concrete consequences for IHL’s capacity to protect human rights and 
reduce superfluous suffering in war. This Section explicates the logic of 
conflation; I defer to the next examples of how this logic affects the law and 
practice of war.  
A. The Aggressor-Defender Model 
Before the U.N. Charter regime, the dualistic axiom rested on two 
rationales, one theological, the other legal. First, in just war theory, anxiety 
about the opaque will of the Christian God led theologians to advocate 
moderation in war by all belligerents, for it would often be impossible to 
know which fought in the service of divine justice, a doctrine known generally 
as “probabilism.” Second, in classical international law, the absence of a jus 
ad bellum rendered the idea of conditioning the application of the jus in bello 
on the former’s observance incoherent. In an era when resort to war could not 
meaningfully be characterized as lawful or unlawful, it made no sense to 
condition the application of the rules governing the conduct of war on such a 
characterization. One reason for conflation in the contemporary law of war is 
that neither of these rationales remains, strictly speaking, applicable. 
First, modern just war theorists either repudiate theology as the basis for 
their views or embrace a more expansive conception of the jus in bello—for it 
is, of course, no longer tenable for theologians to argue that just combatants 
may kill heathens without restraint because the former fight in the service of 
God.155 Indeed, that view would be indistinguishable in principle from the 
justifications for sacred terrorism espoused by terrorist networks like al-
Qaeda.156 Second, in international law, the postwar introduction of a jus ad 
bellum begs the question why aggressors should continue to benefit from the 
jus in bello. The general principle of law ex injuria jus non oritur holds that 
rights cannot arise from illegal acts. On this view, a war initiated in violation 
of the Charter’s jus ad bellum should give rise to no in bello rights. 
A study by the Institut de droit international undertaken shortly after the 
Charter’s introduction, which reflects a strain of thought not uncommon at 
that time, indeed concluded “that ‘there cannot be complete equality’ in the 
operation of the rules of warfare when the competent organ of the United 
Nations determines that one of the belligerents has resorted to armed force 
unlawfully.” 157  To some, that is, the Charter had in effect restored the 
medieval primacy of the jus ad bellum and rendered the jus in bello dependent 
                                                                                                                                                                         
155. Contemporary Christian just war theorists tend to conceptualize the doctrine in terms of 
natural law rather than, strictly, theology. O’BRIEN, supra note 46, at 15. Secular just war theorists tend 
to argue in terms of normative ethics. Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, for example, the locus classicus 
of modern just war theory, describes itself as a work of “practical morality” and deliberately avoids 
ethical foundations. WALZER, supra note 1, at xxiii.  
156. See, e.g., OSAMA BIN LADEN, MESSAGES TO THE WORLD: THE STATEMENTS OF OSAMA BIN 
LADEN 61 (Bruce Lawrence ed., James Howarth trans., 2005); Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet, The 
Guidebook For Taking A Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, § 4, at 1.  
157. DINSTEIN, supra note 48, at 159 (quoting Resolution, Equality of Application of the Rules 
of the Law of War to Parties to an Armed Conflict, 50(II) ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT 
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on the legality of the initial resort to force. 158  From this perspective, 
henceforth  
the accepted rules of war [would] operate only at the option of the States resisting 
aggression; . . . such States may modify them at will; and . . . the aggressor State or States 
cannot derive from their initial illegality any legal rights, including the rights usually 
associated with the conduct of war.159  
Others did not draw this radical conclusion but thought it would be injudicious 
for international law to focus on the jus in bello. They feared that its 
elaboration would interfere with the postwar aspiration to prohibit war 
altogether by implicitly legitimizing wars fought in conformity with IHL.160 
These fears yielded an aggressor-defender model of war that persists in the jus 
in bello to a degree seldom recognized. 
This model, which denies the dualistic axiom and instead affords the 
perceived defender more leeway in its application of the jus in bello than it 
does the perceived aggressor, is not strictly illogical given the Charter; it is, 
experience attests, simply unrealistic. Lauterpacht argued in an early piece, 
which retains its force today, that despite the Charter’s formal terms, “we 
must visualize at least three sets of situations” involving force: (1) where the 
Security Council resolves that one state is the aggressor and authorizes 
collective security measures; (2) where the Council does not or, because of 
institutional paralysis, cannot determine the aggressor by a formal resolution 
but, nonetheless, an “overwhelming consensus” among states exists “as to 
who in fact is the aggressor”; and (3) 
where there has been no collective determination of aggression in any shape or form, but 
where there is a conviction on the part of some States that one belligerent party is the 
aggressor and that it is waging an illegal war. That conviction may be held by both 
belligerent sides, mutually charging one another with being guilty of aggression. States 
outside the conflict may be equally so divided in their assessment of the legal merits of 
the struggle.161  
The Charter’s drafters clearly hoped that the first situation would 
become the norm. As early as 1953, however, it had become clear that the 
latter two situations had to “be regarded as typical, and that any discussion of 
the effects of the illegality of the war as it results from the first possibility 
partakes of a distinct measure of unreality.” 162  Absent an authoritative 
decision on force’s legality, which an institutionally paralyzed Security 
Council could seldom provide, each belligerent would inevitably justify force 
by reference to the Charter, typically as self-defense under Article 51—just as, 
in earlier times, each would inevitably, if disingenuously, claim the mantle of 
justice for itself and deny it to the other. Little had changed since theologians 
and early international lawyers struggled with the will-of-God paradox: that 
                                                                                                                                                                         
158. BROWNLIE, supra note 13, at 406 & n.1 (collecting sources). 
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although it may be absurd to think that a war can be just on both sides in the 
sight of God, it will seldom be possible to ascertain on which side divine 
justice lies. And so “the plea of self-defence will be invoked alike by the 
guilty belligerent and by his victim.”163  
In short, the U.N. Charter enacted a regime in which it would be 
plausible to distinguish the jus in bello applicable to the aggressor from that 
applicable to the defender. In this view, an aggressive war initiated in 
violation of the Charter “should no longer confer upon the guilty belligerent 
all the rights to which he was entitled under traditional international law.”164 
But because international law is a defective legal system, especially insofar as 
it tries to regulate resort to force, in practice,  
any application to the actual conduct of war of the principle ex injuria jus non oritur 
would transform the contest into a struggle which may be subject to no regulation at all. 
The result would be the abandonment of most rules of warfare, including those which are 
of a humanitarian character. . . . [T]hey would in fact cease to operate if their operation 
were made dependent upon the legality of the war on the part of one belligerent or group 
of belligerents.165 
Lauterpacht’s argument became received wisdom.166 Largely for the reasons 
he advanced, the dualistic axiom finds ample support in modern treaties, 
military manuals, and judicial decisions applying the law of war. 167  Yet 
despite this theoretical consensus, the aggressor-defender model persists in 
practice to a degree not fully appreciated. As Lauterpacht predicted, it 
degrades the efficacy of the law. 
 
B. Proportionality 
A second form of conflation involves confusion of ad bellum and in 
bello proportionality. Suppose that Aggressor (A) attacks Victim (V). Perhaps 
A claims to be defending himself or another. But that claim is manifestly 
wrong or unreasonable—even pretextual. A’s resort to force is therefore 
objectively illegal. Under the circumstances, no force may lawfully used by A 
against V. How then can some force still be proportional? Several 
contemporary political theorists offer essentially this syllogism to challenge 
the dualistic axiom. McMahan, for example, argues that unjust combatants—
that is, soldiers fighting an unjust war—cannot comply with the jus in bello 
because except where they “prevent wrongful acts by just combatants, their 
acts of war cannot satisfy the proportionality requirement, and satisfaction of 
this requirement is a necessary condition of permissible conduct in war.”168  
This argument, while not theoretically unassailable, 169  cannot be 
casually dismissed. It makes intuitive sense to say that the amount of tolerable 
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164. Id. at 212. 
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168. McMahan, Ethics of Killing, supra note 17, at 714; see also id. at 708; Hurka, supra note 
14, at 44.  
169. E.g., Benbaji, supra note 43. 
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collateral damage should be greater, for example, “in a war against a 
genocidal enemy such as Nazi Germany . . . than in the Falklands War.”170 
But from a legal perspective, the argument’s real defect lies in its collapse of 
proportionality’s distinct ad bellum and in bello components. The assertion 
that an unjust war cannot be fought justly, without violating in bello 
proportionality, depends on the view that in bello proportionality calls for a 
balance between, on the one hand, the in bello harms caused by force and, on 
the other, the ultimate ad bellum goods to which that force purportedly 
contributes. If those goods, by hypothesis, are objectively not good (or 
unjust), then of course no force in an unjust war can be, in this particular 
sense, proportional: the proportionality dice, so to speak, have been loaded 
from the outset. And because proportionality is an essential part of the in bello 
“rules,” it is equally clear, from this perspective, that the dualistic axiom’s 
strict analytic distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello is a fiction.171 
Not coincidentally, this argument is strongly reminiscent of the scholastic 
opinion that it would be absurd to suppose that a war can be just on both sides 
in the sight of God.172 
To their great credit, McMahan and Hurka alike stress that the “deep 
morality” of war must not be confused with an account of the law of war.173 
Yet because morality influences law,174 it is important to clarify why the 
foregoing syllogism is misguided in law, even were it correct in ethical 
theory—a matter on which I share others’ doubts. Many disagree, in 
particular, with the view that the ad bellum injustice of a state’s decision to 
use force automatically transfers to its individual soldiers, rendering them 
individually morally responsible, and indeed criminally liable, for 
participating in organized violence on behalf of the political elites for whom 
they fight. 175  Furthermore, it should never be forgotten—despite the 
proliferation and general celebration of international criminal law in the post-
Cold War era as one technique to enforce or vindicate IHL—that the main 
purpose of the jus in bello is not to ascribe moral blame or criminal liability; it 
is to protect human dignity and rights and to avert superfluous suffering to the 
greatest extent possible in war.  
By replacing bellum justum with bellum legale,176 postwar international 
lawyers sought to unshackle the jus in bello from its historic dependence on 
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the jus ad bellum, which had been discredited for centuries before the advent 
of the U.N. Charter—not least because the jus ad bellum had proved so 
susceptible to self-serving characterizations and abuse. That is why it is 
legally incorrect to say that military advantage may only justify collateral 
damage if it contributes to an objectively good result.177 Postwar IHL instead 
recognizes that even if an unjust (or illegal) belligerent’s military advantage 
would objectively be an evil, in bello proportionality nonetheless must legally 
consider it as if it were a good. Otherwise, in bello proportionality would 
often be rendered meaningless by each belligerent’s self-serving ad bellum 
judgment.178 In bello proportionality, according to the syllogism set out above, 
would invariably yield the conclusion that unjust or illegal belligerents may 
never inflict collateral damage. In fact, by the same logic, unjust belligerents 
may never even kill and injure combatants with impunity, the most significant 
belligerent right conferred by the jus in bello. That, too, from a moral 
standpoint, may well be an evil, depending on the ultimate ad bellum 
objective of the conflict. Again, however, postwar IHL recognizes that the jus 
in bello would largely cease to function if self-serving judgments of this sort 
were allowed to relieve belligerents of IHL obligations. 
Whatever the force of the foregoing just war argument as a matter of 
ethics, it is therefore a mistake, as a matter of law, to understand in bello 
proportionality to require combatants to weigh in bello harms (for example, 
death, suffering, or property destruction) against architectural ad bellum goods 
(for example, self-defense, territorial conquest, or humanitarian 
intervention)—that is, against the ultimate casus belli advanced to justify 
force.179 In IHL, in bello proportionality instead deliberately tries to specify a 
conception of military necessity that is conceptually removed from ad bellum 
judgments about the legality or justice of the ultimate objectives of force.180 
The answer to the question “in bello proportional to what?” is therefore not 
the (just or unjust, legal or illegal) casus belli. Nor is it “‘the end [of 
victory].’”181 Precisely because this good, if it is a good, will seldom be free 
from doubt (even for soldiers fighting in good faith), in bello proportionality 
instructs them to weigh the “concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated,”182 not the abstract casus belli, against the foreseeable harm to 
civilians. 
McMahan regards this view as plausible but says it trivializes in bello 
proportionality’s moral dimension: “so understood,” he writes, 
“proportionality is not a genuine moral requirement but merely a device that 
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serves the moral purpose of limiting the violence of those who ought not to be 
engaged in warfare at all.” 183  But unless one takes for granted a purely 
deontological account of what it means for a requirement to be genuinely 
moral, it is unclear why this view of in bello proportionality trivializes its 
moral dimension. In law, at any rate, IHL does not adopt one moral 
perspective from among the predominant schools, i.e., either deontology or 
teleology. Indeed, IHL’s norms cannot be reconciled with a univocal moral 
theory.184 They manifest a moral eclecticism comprised of (both act and rule) 
utilitarianism; 185  deontological insistence on the inalienability of certain 
rights;186 and even a residuum of virtue ethics, especially if we appreciate that 
enforcement dynamics (compliance as well as coercion) themselves constitute 
a critical part of law.187 Consider two examples:  
First, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which applies in 
all cases “of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,” prohibits, as to “[p]ersons 
taking no active part in the hostilities,” certain acts, including extrajudicial 
killing and torture, “at any time and in any place whatsoever.”188 This rule, 
which has been recognized as custom,189 is part of the jus in bello. It admits of 
no exception, even though it is easy to envision circumstances in which utility 
(however defined) would be better served by its violation.  
Second, Protocol I prohibits “indiscriminate attacks.”190 That prohibition 
takes an absolute form insofar as civilians may never, whatever the utility, “be 
the object of attack.”191 But it otherwise takes a qualified form. It prescribes a 
flexible calculus by describing as indiscriminate those attacks that “may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”192 
In IHL, “the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” should 
never be confused with, or allowed to collapse back into, the ultimate casus 
belli of a party. By specifying the relevant yardstick at a lower level of 
abstraction—one tied to the facts on the ground—IHL tries to remove 
calculations of in bello proportionality from ultimate military objectives and 
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oft-politicized ad bellum judgments. It tries, that is, to halt the slippery slope 
from “concrete and direct military advantage” to “victory.” In law, even if not 
in the deep morality of war,193 it is therefore incorrect to regard ad bellum 
judgments as necessarily determinative of in bello proportionality 
judgments—still less as relevant to in bello duties of an absolute nature, for 
example, those that prohibit torture, extrajudicial killing, or denial of quarter. 
Again, however, this form of conflation afflicts some recent state practice and 
jurisprudence. Ad bellum proportionality, contrary to the dualistic axiom, at 
times influences in bello proportionality.194  
C. “Supreme Emergency”: Threshold Deontology in IHL? 
The final variant of the logic of conflation that threatens the dualistic 
axiom is the concept of “supreme emergency.” Winston Churchill used this 
phrase to describe Britain’s predicament in the early days of the Second 
World War, when it seemed the Nazis would prevail. Walzer then coined it in 
Just and Unjust Wars to refer to a threat to national survival dire enough to 
warrant overriding otherwise absolute in bello constraints, including, for 
example, the prohibition on intentionally targeting civilians—and presumably, 
therefore, also tactics like terrorism, torture, and carpet bombing.195 At first 
glance, the idea seems straightforward: if the ad bellum stakes become high 
enough, in bello constraints may be overridden. It thus involves, as theorists 
recognize, an explicit denial of the dualistic axiom.196 
The doctrine of supreme emergency bears a family resemblance to the 
moral theory known as threshold deontology.197 Walzer, at least, seems to 
understand it this way.198 Threshold deontology holds that people have rights, 
which ordinarily must be respected without regard for the consequences, but 
that if the bad consequences of respecting those rights become exceptionally 
bad (precisely how bad is unclear and may vary), then those rights may be 
temporarily overridden. Put otherwise, it insists on deontological rights up to a 
particular threshold, but says it is morally permissible, perhaps even 
mandatory, to treat those rights in a utilitarian fashion in extremely dire 
circumstances. 199  As a generic thesis, threshold deontology has been 
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powerfully criticized. The question here is whether it captures the logic of 
supreme emergency as manifest in IHL. It is unclear that it does. 
In particular, as Daniel Statman recently argued, supreme emergency 
theory may not be a variant of threshold deontology at all, because it relies on 
an ideological preference for the members of the polity—typically, the state—
that asserts a right to engage in otherwise prohibited uses of force that violate 
the jus in bello: nuclear attacks, carpet bombing, torture, and so forth.200 That 
may be why Walzer and like-minded theorists concede that even terrorism 
could, not would, be justified (or excused?) in a supreme emergency:201 it 
depends on the nature of the polity. Ordinarily prohibited tactics of war 
become permissible, for many supreme emergency theorists, only if they are 
the exclusive way to prevent an untenable catastrophe to a polity of some 
kind. 
To quote the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons opinion (to which I will return 
below, for it arguably relied on supreme emergency theory to answer a critical 
international legal question), nuclear weapons may perhaps be used “in an 
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State 
would be at stake.” 202  Supreme emergency doctrine, as manifest in this 
quotation, seems to assume that states, as states, have an independent value, 
which exceeds the aggregate interests of their constituents. In short, to 
oversimplify, it assumes that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. 
This particular vision of polities originates in Rousseau’s conception of the 
general will of a society, which has an “associative” value that exceeds the 
“aggregative” value constituted by the sum of the interests of society’s 
members. 203  That is why the survival of “a State” with, suppose, twenty 
million citizens might justify a nuclear strike even if that strike kills forty 
million or more others. 
Supreme emergency theory in IHL may therefore not be best conceived 
as a form of threshold deontology, a theory that ordinarily presupposes a 
utilitarian framework that counts people equally. In fact, the thesis “that 
collectives have a right to kill the innocent if it is the only way to protect 
themselves from enslavement and massacre” often proves inconsistent with 
utilitarianism because the latter posits that “collectives are allowed to give 
priority to their own lives over the lives of others, only after it has been 
demonstrated that such preference will lead to better results overall.”204 Yet 
how can the death of an extra twenty million people be a better result unless 
we ascribe a robust, independent moral value to the association of the 
surviving twenty million as a state? Supreme emergency theory, as manifest 
in the ICJ’s opinion, apparently prioritizes the survival of abstractions, i.e., 
states, over the happiness, preference, well-being, or other utilitarian unit of 
                                                                                                                                                                         
as Hohfeld famously did, between the kinds of rights at stake. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental 
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201. WALZER, supra note 195, at 54; see also C.A.J. Coady, Terrorism, Morality and Supreme 
Emergencies, 114 ETHICS 772 (2004).  
202. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
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value relevant to concrete human beings. It seems, that is, to invest states as 
such with a questionable moral status.  
I say “questionable” because this status is redolent of the position states 
held in classical, prewar international law, which regarded the state as its 
fundamental subject. In contrast, contemporary, postwar international law, 
especially as it relates to the initiation and conduct of hostilities, regards 
people, not states, as its fundamental subject and unit of value. The 
introduction of international human rights law in the postwar era shifted the 
fulcrum of the international legal system from the protection of the interests of 
states—which, in practice, generally meant the interests of their political 
elites—to the protection of human beings.205 This need not entail that no value 
may be ascribed to states based on their associative value as political 
communities, but it does entail that, in the final analysis, “any rights states 
have must derive from and concern the rights of their citizens.”206 A state’s 
value, qua state, is contingent on the extent to which it represents a 
normatively desirable polity,207 and that will vary. Why, after all, should the 
survival of an autocratic regime like North Korea, which starves and 
otherwise abuses its own citizens (or, for that matter, of Nazi Germany) justify 
the use by that state of otherwise prohibited in bello tactics that cause 
unconscionable human suffering? 
In fact, then, supreme emergency theory emerges in this context not as a 
variant of threshold deontology in IHL. Rather, it seems to be an assertion 
about the law of “self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
[State] of the United Nations.”208 The law of self-defense is part of the jus ad 
bellum, not the jus in bello. That is why supreme emergency theory can lead 
to the conflation of these distinct bodies of the law: it confuses the (arguable) 
ad bellum self-defense rights of certain states under the law of the U.N. 
Charter and its progeny with the in bello rights of individuals. The danger of 
this doctrine quickly becomes apparent if we recognize that it admits of no 
limit. The ICJ did not rest its decision in this regard on anything unique about 
nuclear weapons, or about the nature of the state whose survival might be at 
stake. Its logic could equally vindicate any prohibited in bello tactic (torture, 
terrorism, biological or chemical weapons, etc.),209 in defense of any polity. 
To concede that such tactics may be lawful under exigent circumstances is a 
serious cost of conflation.  
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208. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added). 
209. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
266 (July 8). For further analysis, see infra notes 276-285 and accompanying text. 
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IV. THE COST OF CONFLATION 
After each of the twentieth-century world wars, postwar architects—
with memories of war fresh in their minds—expected that states would be 
prepared to forswear, or at least dramatically limit, resort to war, and by 
focusing principally on the jus ad bellum, relegated the jus in bello to 
secondary importance.210 Post-World War I international lawyers sought to 
revive just war theory; post-World War II international lawyers worried that 
the elaboration of IHL would undermine their effort to ban war altogether. In 
part for this reason, our understanding of ad bellum and in bello 
proportionality, and their relation to the Charter’s general prohibition on force, 
is impoverished. The following Sections use the vehicle of ICJ jurisprudence 
and the evidence of recent state practice to suggest how and in what respects.  
Before proceeding, however, I must clarify several methodological 
points that I presuppose and that necessarily qualify the following analysis; it 
would require too much of a digression to defend them here. First, it is often 
(but not always) misguided to accept what the ICJ says as a reflection of what 
the law presently is. Too many international lawyers tend to treat ICJ 
decisions as though they were authoritative pronouncements from upon high 
by an international court of last resort like the Supreme Court of the United 
States. That is false as a matter of positive law: the ICJ’s decisions have no 
binding force except relative to the parties to particular disputes211 and no 
formal precedential value,212 even though the Court and others often treat its 
decisions as highly persuasive and even precedential. Yet in part for that very 
reason, its decisions do matter: they send signals of varying strength to 
different participants in the international legal process. The authority of these 
signals depends on the nature of the recipient. 
Second, the ICJ’s Statute textually limits the sources the Court may 
apply to international disputes brought before it by state consent. 213  The 
italicized words indicate two further qualifications: (1) because the ICJ Statute 
limits the methodological lenses through which the ICJ analyzes disputes to 
the positive sources enumerated in Article 38(1), it may be unsurprising—and 
even jurisprudentially appropriate—that the Court sometimes marginalizes or 
disregards sociopolitical dynamics that seem to influence the jus ad bellum, 
the jus in bello, or their relationship; and (2) because states constitute only one 
of the authors of force that international law strives to regulate today (others 
include insurgents, terrorists, paramilitaries, transnational criminal syndicates, 
militias, and so on), the capacity of the ICJ to pronounce on the contemporary 
law of war is limited. Again, that does not make its decisions irrelevant. Few 
other international institutions speak to major ad bellum issues in the law of 
war with at least theoretical judicial impartiality. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
210. See FRITS KALSHOVEN & LIESBETH ZEGVELD, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 24-
25 (3d ed. 2001). 
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Finally, international law, particularly insofar as it strives to regulate the 
initiation and conduct of armed hostilities, is a defective normative system. 
That is one reason why so many arguments that international law is not really 
law focus on its capacity to regulate war. But even in war, law is a variable in 
the complex of factors that influences how states and other authors of 
collective violence act (although the ICJ’s decisions reflect only one variable 
of that variable). It would be as much a mistake to trivialize the role of 
international law as to overstate it.214 If war lies at the vanishing point of 
international law, itself the “vanishing point of law,”215  still, international 
law—because of, among other compliance dynamics, perceptions of 
legitimacy and authority, reputation, reciprocity, habit, and the self-conception 
of political actors—can influence how participants in war behave. 216 
Conversely, insofar as the law fails to recognize, or to offer realistic guidance 
in view of, technological, geopolitical, and other changes in modern warfare, 
the force of its norms will diminish commensurately. In the next Section, I 
critique some of the ICJ’s jurisprudence and construction of the Charter from 
this general methodological perspective. To be clear, I do not argue that each 
and every judgment below evinces conflation so much as that the ad bellum 
framework established and inflexibly preserved by the Court’s jurisprudence 
in this area contributes to it. 
A. Conflation and the ICJ’s Jurisprudence of War 
1. Corfu Channel 
Perhaps because the Charter’s drafters envisioned self-defense only as a 
failsafe in the event of an actual armed attack, in circumstances where 
immediate collective action would not be feasible,217 the ICJ has repeatedly 
construed Article 51 restrictively—more so than its ordinary meaning 
suggests.218 The ICJ’s consistent policy, despite vast changes in the nature of 
war since 1945, has been to minimize the contingencies for transborder 
                                                                                                                                                                         
214. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly 
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violence.219 In Corfu Channel,220 the ICJ’s first judgment—and the first to 
pronounce (in dictum) on the new jus ad bellum of the Charter—the Court 
held unlawful a U.K. mine-sweeping operation carried out in Albanian 
territorial waters in the Corfu Strait. The United Kingdom swept that strait 
after an incident in which British warships had been disabled and casualties 
suffered because of the mines. While the Court held Albania liable for its 
mining and affirmed the customary right of warships to innocent passage 
through straits, it denied the United Kingdom’s asserted entitlement to self-
help in the face of Albania’s mining of the Corfu Strait and attacks on British 
vessels traversing it.  
In a well-known dictum, the ICJ wrote that it could “only regard the 
alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force, such as 
has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot, 
whatever be the present defects in international organization, find a place in 
international law.”221 Corfu Channel has thus, accurately or not, come to stand 
for the proposition that Article 2(4)’s prohibition on the unilateral resort to 
force does not depend on whether, or how effectively, the U.N. Charter’s 
collective security machinery functions.222 This may be inevitable, for as a 
creature of the U.N. Charter, it would be remarkable for the Court to declare 
the Charter a dead letter. Yet Corfu Channel created a disconnect between the 
formal law of the Charter, as elaborated by the ICJ, and actual state practice. 
This disconnect has become increasingly apparent over time. It has led the 
ICJ, at times, to elide, confuse, or simply fail to engage with difficult but 
pressing questions raised by the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello in 
subsequent law-of-war opinions. 
2. Nicaragua 
More than thirty-five years later, in the watershed judgment in Military 
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua,223 the Court not only 
reinforced the dictum in Corfu Channel;224 it went on to establish, based on 
little more than a nonbinding resolution of the General Assembly defining 
aggression,225 a high threshold for the sort of armed attack under Article 51 
that would suffice to permit a state lawfully to respond in self-defense.226 In 
particular, the Court drew a dubious and vague distinction between “mere 
frontier incident[s]” and “armed attack[s],” and it held that only the latter give 
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rise to an ad bellum right of self-defense.227 State practice and opinio juris—
the textbook components of custom, which the ICJ purported to ascertain 
independently, but which it conveniently and without much analysis found to 
supply a customary law identical to the Charter—indicated a far more 
complex regime.228 But whatever the accuracy of the Court’s holding as a 
matter of custom, the upshot of Nicaragua is that states which suffer attacks 
that fall short of the ICJ’s “armed attack” threshold must, in its view, simply 
endure low-intensity violence, even in the face of a paralyzed Security 
Council that proves consistently unable to respond as the Charter 
presupposes.229  
Relative to the dualistic axiom, Nicaragua’s analysis of Articles 2(4) 
and 51 (or rather, their purported customary analogues) encouraged one form 
of conflation that afflicts the contemporary law of war: collapsing the initial 
judgment about the legality of a particular resort to force into the ad bellum 
proportionality inquiry. Nicaragua effectively detached the Article 51 self-
defense right from the Article 2(4) framework. It created a new lex specialis 
of “armed attack” whereby only some uses of force that violate the Charter, 
although illegal, may “be resisted by force in self-defense, no matter how 
reasonably necessary and proportionate the latter may be, because only some 
amount to an ‘armed attack.’”230 And absent the “condition sine qua non 
required for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence,” the ICJ said, 
“the appraisal of . . . necessity and proportionality takes on a different 
significance.”231  
By restrictively redefining “armed attack” 232  and subordinating ad 
bellum necessity and proportionality constraints to its initial judgments about 
the legality of resort to force under the Charter, the ICJ established a regime 
that prioritizes the oft-politicized ad bellum judgments that international law 
(and previously, just war theory) historically has been unable to regulate 
effectively. Partially for this reason, the ICJ has since struggled, largely in 
vain, to cabin allegedly defensive uses of force rather than to confront the 
difficult, but probably more constructive, regulatory issues about ad bellum 
proportionality. Greenwood aptly asks  
why a state that is the victim of one of the lesser forms of force should not resist such 
force . . . by itself resorting to military means. . . . Of course one can sympathize with the 
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Court’s evident desire to ensure that a minor use of force does not lead to a wholly 
excessive response. Any exercise of the right of self-defence is, however, subject to the 
principle of proportionality. Insistence on compliance with that principle is a more 
effective and realistic way of seeking to prevent an excessive military response than the 
creation of an artificial distinction between different degrees of the use of force.233 
In Nicaragua, as in Corfu Channel, the ICJ’s decision may to some 
extent be both institutionally understandable and defensible. The ICJ sees 
itself as the judicial guardian of the Charter’s ad bellum regime, and the Court 
itself is a creature of the Charter. Yet that does not fully account for the 
Court’s views, which seem to be motivated more by a tacit policy decision 
than anything in the explicit language of the Charter. The ICJ’s focus on the 
initial ad bellum legality of a use of force, and in particular, its lex specialis of 
armed attack, has led it to marginalize those ad bellum components of the law 
of war, especially proportionality, that might be more efficacious in practice. 
And its approach in Nicaragua—to affirm a parsimonious definition of armed 
attack and focus principally on the initial ad bellum legality of force rather 
than to analyze contemporary, unconventional conflicts in all their 
complexity—persists to date. 
3. Oil Platforms 
Consider first Oil Platforms.234 Iran sought reparations for two strikes on 
Iranian offshore oil complexes. The United States launched those strikes in 
response to attacks on Kuwaiti vessels during the “Tanker War” between Iran 
and Iraq.235 On October 16, 1987, a missile hit a Kuwaiti tanker, the Sea Isle 
City, which had been reflagged to the United States for protection. The United 
States ascribed the attack to Iran and responded three days later by attacking 
Iranian oil complexes.236 On April 14, 1988, the Samuel B. Roberts “struck a 
mine in international waters near Bahrain while returning from an escort 
mission”; again, the United States ascribed the attack to Iran and responded by 
attacking offshore Iranian oil platforms.237  
Applying Nicaragua, the ICJ held that neither of these strikes, even in 
the context of a broader pattern of Iranian attacks,238 qualified as an armed 
attack sufficient to give rise to a right of self-defense under the Charter.239 It 
then collapsed that initial judgment of ad bellum illegality into the question of 
whether the U.S. strikes were proportionate to the incidents:240  
As a response to the mining, by an unidentified agency, of a single United States warship, 
which was severely damaged but not sunk, and without loss of life, neither ‘Operation 
Praying Mantis’ as a whole, nor even that part of it that destroyed the Salman and Nasr 
                                                                                                                                                                         
233. Id. at 381 (emphasis added).  
234. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6). 
235. Id. at 174-76. 
236. Id. at 175. 
237. Id. at 175-76. 
238. Id. at 191. 
239. Id. at 192; id. at 195-96.  
240. See id. at 197-99. 
84 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol. 34: 47 
 
 
platforms, can be regarded, in the circumstances of this case, as a proportionate use of 
force in self-defence.241 
At first blush, this may appear to be a reasonable application of ad bellum 
proportionality. But in practice, the ICJ’s approach tends to eviscerate ad 
bellum proportionality as a distinct constraint on force—for, in effect, it insists 
that each military incident be atomized and analyzed in isolation rather than 
contextually. 
Rather than analyze the ad bellum necessity and proportionality of the 
U.S. strikes in the context of the Tanker War and the pervasive threat to 
neutral (including U.S.-flagged) vessels in the Persian Gulf, the ICJ 
disaggregated the conflict into a series of discrete, atomized incidents.242 A 
defensive strike is only ad bellum necessary, in this view, if carried out, first, 
in immediate response to a particular attack and, second, against the attack’s 
direct source.243 In contrast, the Court said, strategic strikes in self-defense 
carried out in an effort to deter future attacks of the same sort were per se 
unlawful. Once the initial attack ends, it reasoned, so too does the ad bellum 
necessity for self-defense.244 And because needless force is illegal, it must 
also be disproportionate. Consequently, the ICJ remarked in a similar vein that 
to be ad bellum proportionate, a strike must be proportional to the particular 
atomized attack that prompts it, rather than to the object of self-defense in the 
context of the conflict as a whole.245 The result of this logic is that ad bellum 
necessity and proportionality dissolve as distinct constraints on the use of 
force: they collapse back into the initial judgment about the legality of resort 
to self-defense. Because few atomized strikes meet the Nicaragua threshold, 
and because self-defense in response to any single strike will be, on this view, 
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needless and disproportionate, it seems “that a state which has been the object 
of an illegal attack can never take the initiative or that its forces may only fire 
if fired upon.”246 
Oil Platforms may thus be understood as a variation on the “just war” 
syllogism set out earlier: if no force may lawfully be used against a target, 
then how can any particular quantum of force be necessary or proportionate? 
Again, the defect here is not of logic but experience. Because the collective 
security machinery of the Charter remains largely dysfunctional even in the 
post-Cold War era, and a fortiori in the post-9/11 era, states invoke, and will 
foreseeably continue to invoke, self-defense to justify resort to force. Just as 
the dualistic axiom insists that legal and illegal force alike comply with the jus 
in bello, including its proportionality constraint, so too should legal and illegal 
force alike be required to comply with ad bellum proportionality. Otherwise, 
this theoretically distinct constraint on force collapses back into the initial 
judgment about the lawfulness of that force, degrading the efficacy of the jus 
ad bellum as a whole. States may well be influenced to mitigate the amount or 
manner of force applied to a target. But seldom if ever will they relinquish the 
right to resort to force altogether in circumstances of perceived self-defense or 
national security. 
4. Armed Activities 
Armed Activities, probably the most significant recent decision on the 
law of war, reflects the same misguided view. In it, the ICJ declined to 
determine the jus ad bellum applicable to a chaotic, multiparty civil war that 
had spilled over the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
and threatened the national security of adjacent states, including Uganda. It 
instead assimilated the facts to a traditional interstate conflict and applied the 
incongruous Nicaragua framework. Judge Kooijmans accurately critiqued the 
majority’s analysis, stressing that it  
inadequately reflects the structural instability and insecurity in the region, the overall 
pattern of lawlessness and disorder and the reprehensible behaviour of all parties 
involved. A reading of the Judgement cannot fail to leave the impression that the dispute 
is first and foremost a dispute between two neighbouring States about the use of force 
and the ensuing excesses, perpetrated by one of them. A two-dimensional picture may 
correctly depict the object shown but it lacks depth and therefore does not reflect reality 
in full.247 
In particular, Uganda had intervened in the eastern region of the DRC based 
on the perceived threats to its national security set forth in the “Safe Haven” 
document promulgated by the Ugandan High Command.248 It asserted a need, 
among other ad bellum goals, (1) to “neutralize . . . Uganda[n] dissident 
groups which have been receiving assistance from the Government of the 
DRC and the Sudan”; and (2) “[t]o prevent the genocidal elements, namely, 
the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, which have been launching attacks on the 
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people of Uganda . . . from continuing to do so.”249 Just as the United States 
did not, despite Nicaragua and its progeny, refrain from attacking Afghanistan 
given that the Taliban regime hosted nonstate actors that had attacked the 
United States repeatedly, neither could Uganda reasonably be expected to 
allow hostile nonstate belligerents to operate against it from within chaotic 
regions of the eastern DRC—nonstate belligerents which Kabila’s 
dysfunctional government proved either unable or unwilling to control. 
Still, citing Nicaragua, the ICJ insisted that Uganda could not avail itself 
of the right to self-defense.250 Tellingly, it considered in this regard only “one 
of the five listed objectives” of Operation Safe Haven because only one, in its 
view, “refer[red] to a response to acts that had already taken place.”251 Now, 
in part, it seems likely that the ICJ did not want to opine on, still less be 
perceived to validate, either anticipatory or preventive self-defense in light of 
the U.S. assertion of the latter right in its 2002 National Security Strategy.252 
But the ICJ thereby, as Judge Kooijmans observed, elided the critical issues in 
Armed Activities and “missed a chance to fine-tune the position it took 20 
years ago in spite of the explicit invitation by one of the Parties to do so.”253 It 
absolved itself of its paramount obligation as the judicial organ of the United 
Nations: to answer the questions of international law raised by disputes 
submitted to it consensually by states—in this case, questions about how the 
Charter’s jus ad bellum applies to “large-scale attacks by irregular forces.”254  
Judge Simma, too, lamented this missed opportunity.255 He noted that “a 
restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have reflected the state, or rather 
the prevailing interpretation, of the international law of self-defence for a 
long time,” but that “in the light of more recent developments not only in 
State practice but also with regard to accompanying opinio juris, it ought 
urgently to be reconsidered.”256 Furthermore, as in Oil Platforms, the Court 
declined to consider how ad bellum proportionality applied once it found 
unlawful Uganda’s initial resort to force. 257  At least tacitly, the majority 
reasoned that its initial finding of ad bellum illegality obviated the need to 
examine issues of ad bellum proportionality: again, no force, by this 
misguided logic, can be ad bellum proportionate if force may not be deployed 
in the first place.258 Armed Activities, like Oil Platforms, degrades the efficacy 
                                                                                                                                                                         
249. Id. 
250. See id. paras. 142-47. 
251. Id. para. 143. 
252. See THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
253. 2005 I.C.J. 116 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 25).  
254. Id. para. 147). 
255. See id. (separate opinion of Judge Simma, paras. 8-15).  
256. See id. para. 11 (emphasis added). 
257. See id. (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, paras. 31-33) (critiquing the Court for its 
failure to examine necessity and proportionality in this regard and concluding that some Ugandan 
military action should be deemed both necessary and proportionate, even though Uganda subsequently 
violated these ad bellum conditions). 
258. That said, the Court did, appropriately, proceed to consider the DRC’s allegations of in 
bello violations by Ugandan forces. But it nonetheless failed to apply the dualistic axiom correctly, both 
because it neglected to consider in bello proportionality and because it intimated that the legality vel non 
of Uganda’s “belligerent occupation” of part of the DRC changed the applicable jus in bello. See id. 
paras. 60-61 (majority opinion). 
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of the jus ad bellum: Uganda might mitigate the manner or quantum of force it 
applies, but it is extremely unlikely to relinquish its right to self-defense if it 
perceives, rightly or not, a threat to its national security. Offering guidance on 
ad bellum regulatory strategies like proportionality, rather than simply 
condemning force as unlawful under the anachronistic Nicaragua framework, 
therefore might well increase the efficacy of the modern law of war. 
5. The Wall 
The ICJ’s advisory opinion in The Wall illustrates the point. 259  The 
Court’s bottom line—that the wall built by Israel in the Occupied Territories 
violates its obligations under both IHL and international human rights law—
strikes me as accurate.260 Israeli settlements in the West Bank violate, inter 
alia, Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.261 But because of Israel’s 
decision not to participate in the advisory proceedings, and because of the 
Court’s failure to conduct an independent, impartial investigation for itself (or 
even to solicit additional evidence), the majority manifestly lacked “the 
requisite factual bases for its sweeping findings.”262 Even assuming, as Judge 
Buergenthal stressed, 
that on a thorough analysis of all the relevant facts, a finding could well be made that 
some or even all segments of the wall . . . violate international law . . . . [T]o reach that 
conclusion with regard to the wall as a whole without having before it or seeking to 
ascertain all relevant facts bearing directly on issues of Israel’s legitimate right of self-
defence, military necessity and security needs, given the repeated deadly terrorist attacks 
in and upon Israel proper coming from the Occupied Palestinian Territory to which Israel 
has been and continues to be subjected, cannot be justified as a matter of law. . . . In my 
view, the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian people would have been better served 
had the Court taken these considerations into account, for that would have given the 
Opinion the credibility I believe it lacks.263 
In fact, the majority opinion lacks not only credibility but analytic clarity 
relative to the proper analysis of the law of war. The result is, as Judge 
Buergenthal emphasizes, a disservice to the humanitarian objectives that the 
majority purports to vindicate.  
Assume the Court correctly found that Israel cannot assert a right of self-
defense in this context and that the wall as such therefore violates the 
                                                                                                                                                                         
259. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).  
260. Id. at 201. 
261. Id. at 182-84. 
262. Id. at 240 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal). To decide the validity of Israel’s security 
claims, the Court relied on little more than a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and a 
statement Israel submitted “limited to issues of jurisdiction and judicial propriety,” although the Court 
said it included “observations on other matters,” including Israel’s security concerns. Id. at 162; see also 
id. at 243-44 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal) (noting that the Court “fails to address any facts or 
evidence specifically rebutting Israel’s claim of military exigencies or requirements of national security” 
and “barely addresses the summaries of Israel’s position on this subject that are attached to the 
Secretary-General’s report and which contradict or cast doubt on the material the Court claims to rely 
on”). It would have been advisable, in my judgment, for the ICJ not to hear the case as a matter of its 
discretion. See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 28-29 (Oct. 16); Status of Eastern 
Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 28-29 (July 23); see also 2004 I.C.J. at 207-
11 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).  
263. 2004 I.C.J. at 240-41 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal) (emphasis added). 
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Charter’s jus ad bellum.264 The dualistic axiom should be understood to insist 
that this conclusion is irrelevant to Israel’s duty to respect (1) ad bellum 
necessity and proportionality; and (2) the jus in bello in its entirety, including 
in bello proportionality.265 The ICJ failed to examine either issue. Instead, its 
analysis essentially ceased after it condemned the wall as unlawful force. It 
thereafter supplied little more than a conclusory litany of various treaty 
provisions that it said the wall violated.  
It is not that the ICJ necessarily erred in finding the wall unlawful (or in 
violation of these treaties); it is that, even so, the dualistic axiom should have 
led the Court to offer guidance on ad bellum and in bello law beyond merely 
condemning illegal force. Instead, the ICJ effectively allowed its conclusion 
that Israel lacked the right to self-defense to obviate the need for this analysis. 
Whatever the ad bellum legality of the wall as a measure of self-defense, for 
example, the dualistic axiom requires an independent in bello proportionality 
analysis—that is, an analysis of the extent to which the wall may be “expected 
to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated.”266 The Court (lacking evidence on this 
issue) simply neglected it. In fact, The Wall may be seen as an extreme 
version of denying the analytic independence of ad bellum and in bello 
judgments: it suggests that the former not only affect but determine the latter. 
Relative to in bello proportionality, the Court, without evidentiary analysis, 
offered only the ipse dixit that it  
is not convinced that the specific course Israel has chosen for the wall was necessary to 
attain its security objectives. The wall, along the route chosen, and its associated régime 
gravely infringe a number of rights of Palestinians residing in the territory occupied by 
Israel, and the infringements resulting from that route cannot be justified by military 
exigencies or by the requirements of national security or public order.267 
But absent a bona fide appraisal of Israel’s avowed security needs or claims of 
military exigency, this conclusion rings hollow: “[t]he Court says that it ‘is 
not convinced’ but it fails to demonstrate why it is not convinced, and that is 
                                                                                                                                                                         
264. I seriously doubt this conclusion. The wall, like the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, is a weapon—a defensive weapon, to be sure, but a weapon. Its lawfulness as 
self-defense depends on whether Israel has been the victim of an “armed attack.” U.N. Charter art. 51; 
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unsupported by authority, in which it claims that Article 51 only permits self-defense in response to the 
“armed attack by one State against another State,” 2004 I.C.J. at 194. But see Schachter, supra note 29, 
at 311. The Court also claims that the right of self-defense does not apply against threats that originate 
from within a state’s territory. 2004 I.C.J. at 194. The first proposition is doubtful: the text of Article 51 
contains no such limitation, and its imposition is in tension with recent resolutions of the Security 
Council. See id. at 242 (declaration of Judge Buergenthal); id. at 215 (separate opinion of Judge 
Higgins); id. at 229-30 (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans). The second proposition is equally 
doubtful: states retain the right to respond in self-defense to insurgencies within their own territory, 
provided their response is necessary and proportionate and otherwise complies with international law. 
Id. at 215 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins). The Court also contradicts itself by ignoring the essential 
(and accurate) premise of the remainder of its opinion: that the Occupied Territories do not constitute 
Israeli territory under international law. See id. at 166-67. 
265. See Sassòli, supra note 11, at 251-52. 
266. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added). 
267. 2004 I.C.J. at 193.  
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why these conclusions are not convincing.” 268  A more credible and 
sophisticated analysis would have sought and considered evidence bearing on 
the asserted military exigency carefully, even assuming the wall were 
unlawful, 269  and then opined on proportionality relative to “individual 
segments of its route.”270  
The ICJ’s tacit justification for disregarding the dualistic axiom in The 
Wall seems to be the view criticized by Lauterpacht more than fifty years ago: 
that any effort to offer guidance on the conduct of hostilities in the context of 
unlawful force might confer a veneer of legitimacy on that force. This is 
misguided, for “[i]t is not the existence of rules for the conduct of war which 
causes states to resort to force but more fundamental factors in international 
relations.”271 The foregoing logic is also counterproductive. Unsurprisingly, 
and as experience since The Wall attests, Israel will not accept (nor would any 
state) the Court’s cavalier dismissal of its national security interests. Nor will 
it obey an order to dismantle the wall forthwith. That does not mean the ICJ 
should refrain from declaring a situation unlawful or issuing an appropriate 
remedy because it anticipates disobedience; only that it should not allow this 
initial finding to obviate the need for further legal analysis. It is not 
unreasonable to believe that had the ICJ made its views on proportionality 
available, Israel would have considered them. 
This is not speculation: Israeli decisions suggest the same. In Beit Sourik 
Village Council v. Israel,272 and Mara’abe v. Prime Minister of Israel,273 the 
Israeli Supreme Court considered the complex, fact-intensive judgments about 
in bello proportionality raised by the wall (or security fence). Based on a 
sophisticated in bello analysis, it ordered parts dismantled, other parts 
modified to take less injurious routes, and changes to Israeli law. These 
orders, backed by effective domestic institutions of enforcement, did much 
more to ameliorate the injuries to Palestinians than did the ICJ’s opinion, 
which simply declared the wall unlawful and then neglected the hard 
questions about in bello proportionality. This is not to suggest that the Israeli 
Supreme Court necessarily gave the right answer on each issue. But its 
willingness to work out a concrete theory of in bello proportionality and to 
apply it to the factually complex, politically sensitive circumstances of the 
conflict contributed far more to IHL’s objectives than the ICJ’s categorical 
declaration and elision of the dualistic axiom.  
True, the ICJ has a limited capacity for factfinding and a distinct 
institutional role within the international system. It would be misguided to 
suggest that the Court could, or should, have undertaken an analysis 
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comparable in specificity or approach to that contained in the Israeli decisions. 
But had it rigorously analyzed the jus in bello after finding the wall unlawful, 
Beit Sourik and Mara’abe suggest that its judgment would have been 
considered seriously by the Israeli courts. By declining to engage difficult in 
bello issues, the ICJ failed to offer guidance to a state whose judiciary has 
historically treated international law seriously. Because domestic 
incorporation and internalization is one of the most effective means by which 
international law is enforced,274 the ICJ’s approach in The Wall seems not 
only misguided but counterproductive. It did little but weaken the ICJ’s 
credibility and authority for the future. The Wall’s failure to analyze the facts 
rigorously or to consider Israel’s claims of military necessity diminishes the 
decision’s force. Outside the politically charged context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, one may be sure that states, relative to themselves, will 
not heed a judgment that dismisses the relevance of their national security 
interests. 
The Wall also took the misguided logic of Oil Platforms one step further. 
In Oil Platforms, the Court found the U.S. attacks unjustified under the U.N. 
Charter and then collapsed ad bellum necessity and proportionality into its 
initial judgment that the U.S. strikes violated Article 51. In The Wall, the 
Court collapsed both ad bellum and in bello proportionality into its dubious 
conclusion about the scope of Article 51: that self-defense may only be 
invoked against states. Despite its significance, this issue occupied a single 
paragraph in the opinion.275 By blurring the ad bellum-in bello distinction, the 
Court forwent an opportunity to shape international law, to influence state 
behavior, and perhaps to reduce superfluous suffering in war, the paramount 
objective of modern IHL. 
6. Nuclear Weapons 
In its advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons, the consequences of the 
ICJ’s myopic focus on regulating the contingencies for resort to self-defense 
in the first instance rather than on the more difficult issues of ad bellum and in 
bello law led to a holding that most regard as, at best, confused. The General 
Assembly had asked the ICJ to advise it whether “the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons [is] in any circumstances permitted under international law.”276 After 
dismissing certain nondispositive alternative arguments, the ICJ turned to “the 
most directly relevant applicable law”: the law “relating to the use of force 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the law applicable in armed 
conflict which regulates the conduct of hostilities.”277 It suggested, that is, that 
both ad bellum and in bello law bear on the legality of the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons. 
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The ICJ opined that although the unique characteristics of nuclear 
weapons, including their awesome destructiveness and inherent inability to 
respect the principle of distinction, “seem[] scarcely reconcilable with” the jus 
in bello, it lacked “sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty 
that the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the 
principles and rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any 
circumstance.”278 In part, the Court may have had in mind the hypothetical 
circumstances posed by Judge Schwebel in dissent, for example, the tactical 
use of a nuclear depth charge to disable a nuclear-armed submarine known to 
be planning a direct attack on a city in the target state.279  Yet the ICJ’s 
Delphic and controversial 7-7 holding, broken by its president, suggests 
another possibility. The Court notoriously held that while 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law; . . . [it] cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.280 
The former sentence, it seems, declares nuclear weapons “generally” illegal 
under the jus in bello (except, perhaps, in unlikely scenarios such as those 
suggested by Judge Schwebel).281 The latter proposes that nuclear weapons 
might still be lawful given high enough stakes. As Judges Higgins and 
Schwebel alike stressed, this de facto non liquet holding is breathtaking:282 no 
state had even argued that a use of nuclear weapons that violates the jus in 
bello may become lawful if it satisfies the jus ad bellum.283 If this reading is 
accurate, the ICJ’s holding clearly violates the dualistic axiom, for the jus in 
bello does not, in this view, apply uniformly to all parties. Rather, the state 
acting in an “extreme circumstance of self-defence . . . in which [its] very 
survival . . . would be at stake” apparently may use weapons that would be 
legally prohibited were they deployed by its adversary.284 
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Another plausible reading, however, is that the ICJ rejected the dualistic 
axiom in an even deeper sense. Note that it related Article 51 to what it 
described as “the fundamental right of every State to survival, and thus its 
right to resort to self-defence . . . when its survival is at stake.” 285  This 
suggests that the Court may not have intended to imply that force that violates 
the jus in bello might still be legal if it satisfies the jus ad bellum. Rather, as 
suggested earlier, the Court may have had in mind scenarios that political 
theorists refer to as supreme emergencies. If so, the ICJ arguably meant that 
where “the very survival of a State would be at stake,”286 nuclear weapons 
would not violate in bello proportionality at all because of the peculiar logic 
of supreme emergency theory, which elevates states to or well beyond the 
moral status of persons. The jus in bello, that is, ceases to be as relevant, or 
relevant at all, if “the fundamental right of [a] State to survival”287 is at stake. 
Needless to say, a right of states to survive does not appear in the U.N. 
Charter or other positive law. Consistent with the logic of supreme 
emergency, it rather seems to be an assertion about an allegedly inherent right 
of states, which derives from their presumed associative value. On this view, 
states, like individuals in Hobbes’s state of nature, have a natural right to self-
defense and survival that cannot be relinquished. If this reading is correct, 
Nuclear Weapons involves a frequent, but always questionable and often 
dangerously anachronistic, argument: that states may coherently be analogized 
to people and that they necessarily enjoy an equal or greater moral status in 
international law. 
On either view, the ICJ’s opinion has disquieting implications beyond 
the unique horror of nuclear weapons. There is no principled reason to limit its 
logic to particular weapons or methods of warfare. Chemical or biological 
weapons, too, would be justified to ensure a state’s survival, as would torture, 
summary execution, terrorism, denial of quarter, and other in bello 
violations—provided only that the cost of military defeat in ad bellum terms 
reaches a sufficient level, that is, the destruction of a state or (perhaps) a 
cognate nonstate polity. A core purpose of the dualistic axiom is to avoid this 
kind of misguided logic. Taken to its extreme, it leads inexorably to the 
destruction of independent constraints on the use of force by polities. Such 
entities may, in this view, arrogate to themselves an associative value that 
exceeds the aggregate interests of their constituents. Even apart from general 
philosophical objections, one obvious problem with this contention in the 
context of international law is that it cannot be limited in principle to the 
survival of “desirable” polities—say, to liberal democratic states.288 States like 
North Korea may equally invoke this sort of logic to justify IHL violations 
and disregard the dualistic axiom—as may nonstate collectives, such as al-
Qaeda, that espouse some collective, sacred value higher than the individual. 
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7. Conclusion 
From its inception, the ICJ has focused almost exclusively on preserving 
its restrictive reading of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter in its jurisprudence of 
war. In part as a result, it has paid little attention to working out the concrete 
contours of the distinct requirements of ad bellum and in bello proportionality. 
It has effectively reasoned, in the spirit of the just war syllogism explored 
earlier, that where a state, in its view, violates Article 51 because the armed 
attack threshold established in Nicaragua has not been met, no quantum of 
force can qualify as ad bellum necessary or proportionate. Nor, according to 
The Wall’s logic, is it necessary to examine in bello proportionality once it has 
been determined that a state had no right to resort to force in the first instance. 
This jurisprudence tends to degrade the efficacy of ad bellum and in bello 
proportionality as distinct and independent constraints on force. It treats 
(arguable) violations of Article 51 as sufficient to obviate the need for a more 
in-depth legal analysis. Most disturbing, according to the logic of Nuclear 
Weapons, ad bellum goals that presuppose the associative value of polities qua 
polities, like the “very survival of a State,” apparently may supersede in bello 
requirements, even of an absolute nature, authorizing tactics that IHL 
absolutely prohibits. 
B. Conflation in State Practice 
The ICJ’s decisions do not necessarily offer the best indicia of the actual 
state of international law or practice. Yet recent state practice also suggests 
how failure to apply the dualistic axiom may affect the conduct of hostilities. 
Below, I briefly examine three examples: (1) NATO’s 1999 air campaign 
against Serbia in an avowed effort to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo; (2) 
the brief but tragic conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 
summer of 2006, which, for lack of a common name, I refer to as the Thirty-
Four Day War; and (3) the resurrection of candidly justified torture as a tactic 
of war.289 
1. Kosovo 
In March 1999, Serbian forces launched attacks on the Kosovo 
Liberation Army and targeted ethnic Albanian civilians. 290  In response, 
NATO organized air strikes against Serbian targets, flying more than 38,000 
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sorties over the course of the conflict.291 A ground invasion might well have 
been more effective and efficient and, as relevant here, might have better 
enabled NATO to distinguish between civilians and combatants. The aerial 
war, according to most analysts, took more time than a ground war, killed or 
injured more civilians, and caused more damage to Serbia’s civilian 
infrastructure,292 not to mention accidents like the bombing of the Chinese 
Embassy.293 
NATO members chose to carry out the war solely by air, however, 
because their political elites believed their domestic constituents would not 
tolerate casualties. And to minimize the risk to pilots from Serbian anti-
aircraft defenses, NATO planes flew at a minimum height of 15,000 feet.294 
After some strikes mistakenly killed civilians, including refugees, NATO’s in 
bello conduct came under intensified scrutiny.295 Critics argued that NATO 
could have averted these mistakes with better target-sighting techniques, in 
particular, visual confirmation (either by pilots flying at lower altitudes or by 
ground troops confirming target selection).296 This criticism intensified when 
the war did not end as quickly as NATO had anticipated. As the campaign’s 
success seemed less certain and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević refused 
to relent promptly, the issue of potential ground troop deployment gained 
renewed attention.297 NATO never sent troops into Kosovo, however, because 
of both the difficulty of achieving supranational consensus298 and the expected 
domestic political opposition to any military action that would risk 
casualties.299  
On June 10, 1999, after nearly four months, the conflict ended. Total 
civilian casualties numbered around five hundred,300 and Serbia had sustained 
severe damage to its civilian infrastructure. These facts, among others, 
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weakened popular support for NATO’s conduct 301  and motivated various 
organizations to appraise the legality of NATO’s tactics ex post.302 Multiple 
parties even requested that ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte investigate 
NATO for war crimes,303 although she found a full investigation unwarranted 
based on a report prepared by a committee established to review NATO’s in 
bello conduct.304 The Prosecutor’s Report embraced the dualistic axiom. It 
rejected any notion “that the ‘bad’ side had to comply with the law while the 
‘good’ side could violate it at will” and based this view on the usual rationale 
that a legal asymmetry “would be most unlikely to reduce human suffering in 
conflict.” 305  The Report also acknowledged that military commanders are 
obliged: 
a) to do everything practicable to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military 
objectives,  
b) to take all practicable precautions in the choice of methods and means of warfare with 
a view to avoiding or, in any event to minimizing incidental civilian casualties or civilian 
property damage, and  
c) to refrain from launching attacks which may be expected to cause disproportionate 
civilian casualties or civilian property damage.306  
Now, “everything practicable” does not mean “everything.” But it is 
unclear whether the Report held NATO to the former standard. Its analysis of 
in bello proportionality elides the question whether NATO acted lawfully by 
focusing on an alleged lack of clarity in IHL.307 Even though, it says, “NATO 
air commanders have a duty to take practicable measures to distinguish 
military objectives from civilians or civilian objectives,” and even though they 
deliberately avoided any risk to NATO combatants by flying at an altitude that 
“meant the target could not be verified with the naked eye,” still, “it appears 
that with the use of modern technology, the obligation to distinguish was 
effectively carried out in the vast majority of cases during the bombing 
campaign.” 308  Furthermore, the Report says, “there is nothing inherently 
unlawful about flying above the height which can be reached by enemy air 
defenses.”309  
These conclusions may be right, yet many commentators have 
concluded otherwise.310 And apart from strict questions of legality, NATO’s 
tactics “sent a message that could hardly be lost on the world: that Americans 
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considered one American life to be worth thousands of Yugoslav lives—
hardly a resounding endorsement of the doctrine of universal human 
rights.”311 Of course, even if NATO violated IHL at the margins and deployed 
questionable tactics from a policy perspective, it is clearly a distinct question 
whether it would be appropriate to prosecute NATO combatants for war 
crimes given the nature of the alleged violations.312 Arguable violations of in 
bello proportionality by NATO at the margins do not compare to the 
deliberate targeting of civilians, still less to the kind of serious atrocities on 
which the Tribunal has properly focused: extrajudicial killing, rape, torture, 
ethnic cleansing, and the like. But an impartial review of the Report would at 
a minimum leave some doubt in the reviewer’s mind as to whether NATO’s 
ad bellum justification for the air strikes did not affect its conclusions about 
the legality of NATO’s in bello conduct.  
NATO engaged in a four-month campaign of brutal air strikes against 
Serbia, deploying fighter planes at heights that reduced the risk to its own 
combatants to zero at the cost of a substantial increase in the risk to Serbia’s 
civilians.313 Beyond more than five hundred civilian deaths, Serbian civilians 
suffered horrible injuries, and its economy and infrastructure sustained severe 
damage from which it still has not fully recovered. Had the avowed goal of 
the air strikes been to annex Kosovo or to further—rather than to halt—ethnic 
cleansing,314 would the Report have been so quick to dismiss allegations that 
NATO violated in bello proportionality? Concededly, we can only speculate. 
But many organizations and analysts have suggested it would not have been. I 
endorse NATO’s action under the circumstances. But we should acknowledge 
that NATO’s avowed ad bellum goal, which some described as legitimate 
even if not lawful, arguably influenced its in bello conduct. 
2. The Thirty-Four Day War 
On July 12, 2006, a Hezbollah attack on the Israeli Defense Forces 
(IDF) rapidly escalated into a thirty-four day conflict,315 ending in a U.N.-
brokered ceasefire.316 Both Israel and Hezbollah attacked dual-use targets and 
civilian areas during the war, killing, injuring, and displacing civilians.317 
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Israel, for example, attacked Beirut’s airport, media transmission stations, and 
transportation routes.318 Its attack on Qana killed scores of civilians.319 In its 
defense, Israel emphasized that Hezbollah intentionally used these civilian 
areas for military operations and turned civilians into “human shields.”320 
Both sides engaged in retaliatory rhetoric and suggested that in bello 
violations perpetrated by their forces could be justified as reprisals. Sheik 
Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s leader, said that “[a]s long as the enemy acts without 
limitations or red lines, it’s our right to continue the confrontation without 
limits.”321 At one point, Israeli U.N. Ambassador Gillerman, responding to 
allegations that Israel was using disproportionate force, replied, “You’re damn 
right we are.”322 
Israel appealed to the nature of Hezbollah to justify its strikes in civilian 
areas. It appealed, that is, to an ad bellum consideration (the nature of the 
enemy) to justify prima facie in bello violations. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni 
argued that “[p]roportionality is not compared to the event, but to the threat, 
and the threat is bigger and wider than the captured soldiers. Unfortunately, 
civilians sometimes pay the price of giving shelter to terrorists.” 323  In a 
Security Council meeting, Gillerman apologized for the civilian deaths but 
stressed the “huge moral disequivalence between the two sides,” for “[w]hile 
our enemies . . . specifically target women and children . . . , we are defending 
ourselves in this brutal war.”324  
Both of the preceding statements mix in bello considerations (the 
principle of distinction, civilians) with ad bellum ones (self-defense, the 
nature of the threat).325 While the IDF and Hezbollah alike seem to have 
violated IHL,326 for present purposes, the point of emphasis lies less in those 
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violations as such than it does in the failure of both the belligerents and their 
critics to distinguish ad bellum from in bello violations. Cannizzaro notes that 
critics frequently referred to the “disproportionate character of Israel’s 
response” without clarifying “which kind of proportionality was being 
referred to. Quite often the[] statements contain[ed] elements of both jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello arguments.”327 In fact, the war raised distinct issues for 
each of these bodies of law. One question is the ad bellum legality of Israel’s 
resort to force and its ad bellum proportionality relative to the casus belli that, 
for Israel, justified it. Another, which should be distinct, is the in bello 
proportionality of particular strikes. 
The immediate casus belli for Israel’s incursion into Lebanon was 
Hezbollah’s attack with Katyusha rockets and mortars launched from 
Lebanese territory at IDF bases near the Israeli border town of Zarit. 328 
Hezbollah used those attacks as a diversion. During them, it crossed the 
border into Israel, attacked an IDF patrol, kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, 
killed three, and wounded two.329 Israel responded with a rescue mission. An 
attack by Hezbollah then claimed the lives of four of the Israeli soldiers 
engaged in “hot pursuit.”330 Israel thus argued that Hezbollah’s attacks, in the 
aggregate, justified its use of force in self-defense. Although an early (July 12) 
Israeli Cabinet communiqué suggested that Israel would hold Lebanon 
“responsible for the action that originated on its soil,”331 Israel soon modified 
its asserted casus belli. A July 16 statement clarified that “Israel is not fighting 
Lebanon but the terrorist element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts, who 
have made Lebanon a hostage and created Syrian—and Iranian—sponsored 
terrorist enclaves of murder.”332 
Israel’s casus belli thus relied on the U.S. precedent of attacking 
Afghanistan for harboring al-Qaeda during and after the attacks of 9/11—
except that scant evidence suggested that the government of Lebanon, unlike 
the Taliban relative to al-Qaeda, actively supported Hezbollah. In fact, the 
situation bore more resemblance to Uganda’s justification for its military 
incursion into the DRC based on the inability of Kabila’s regime to control 
forces hostile to Uganda in the eastern region of that vast state, which, like 
Afghanistan, had been in the midst of a chaotic civil war. The ICJ, as noted, 
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has not, despite explicit invitations, offered guidance on the jus ad bellum that 
applies in this kind of increasingly common situation. Furthermore, beyond 
the question whether Israel’s initial resort to force was ad bellum lawful, the 
war raised deeply complex questions of ad bellum proportionality. Launching 
a full-scale, transborder war in response to a relatively trivial attack by 
Hezbollah initially seems manifestly disproportionate. And that would be an 
accurate conclusion based on Nicaragua and its progeny. Yet is that a 
plausible or realistic way to analyze the situation? 
In Israel’s view, the kidnapping culminated a series of similar attacks 
that should be properly analyzed, not as isolated, atomized incidents, but in 
the aggregate.333 Livni thus emphasized that proportionality must be judged in 
terms of the overall threat posed by Hezbollah, not “as an answer to a single 
incident.” 334  John Bolton, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 
offered a comparable defense of Israel’s resort to force. Responding to 
allegations that Israel acted disproportionately, he remarked:  
What Hezbollah has done is kidnap Israeli soldiers and rain rockets and mortar shells on 
innocent Israeli civilians. What Israel has done in response is an act of self-defense. And 
I don’t quite understand what the argument about proportionate force means here. Is 
Israel entitled only to kidnap two Hezbollah operatives and fire a couple of rockets 
aimlessly at Lebanon?335 
Bolton’s remark, despite the rhetorical sarcasm, reflects a very real and 
troubling gap in international law.  
Proportionality, in both its in bello and ad bellum manifestations, is not, 
as EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana said with reference to the in bello 
law governing the Thirty-Four Day War, “a mathematical concept.”336 It is 
clearly not calculated according to the archaic lex talionis principle. But few 
seem to know how it should be calculated. Relative to the jus ad bellum, 
Nicaragua and its progeny hold that a minor cross-border incursion does not 
qualify as an armed attack sufficient to authorize self-defense. Yet in an era 
characterized by internal conflicts between nonstate belligerents, terrorist 
strikes emanating from states that prove unable or unwilling to control their 
borders, and asymmetrical wars of attrition, is it realistic to suppose that states 
will tolerate repeated “minor” attacks, which may amount to “death by a 
thousand pinpricks”? At some point, a state will deem those attacks, in the 
aggregate, an armed attack that justifies self-defense every bit as much as a 
conventional attack by one state on another, the paradigm in the minds of the 
U.N. Charter’s drafters. Some therefore argue that Israel’s initial resort to self-
defense in the Thirty-Four Day War can be justified given recent state 
                                                                                                                                                                         
333. See, e.g., Press Release, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind the Headlines: The 
Second Lebanon War—One Year Later, (July 12, 2007), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ 
About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/The%20Second%20Lebanon%20War%20-%20One%20 
year%20later%20-%20July%202007. 
334. Herb Keinon, Israel Dismisses Assad Cease-Fire Call as ‘Bizarre’, JERUSALEM POST, July 
20, 2006, at 1. 
335. CNN.com, Bolton Defends Israel’s Actions in Lebanon, July 24, 2006, 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/23/mideast.bolton/index.html. 
336. Keinon, supra note 334. Israeli Foreign Minister Livni expressed this view in the ad 
bellum context, while EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana expressed a comparable view relative to in bello 
law. Yet neither these speakers nor the article reporting their comments distinguishes the two. 
100 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol. 34: 47 
 
 
practice,337 even if the casus belli did not render ad bellum proportionate 
particular strikes in Lebanon “beyond the territory controlled by 
Hezbollah.”338  
Israel defended its military response in terms redolent of the U.S. view 
of ad bellum proportionality rejected by the ICJ in Oil Platforms: that it is ad 
bellum proportionate, not only to respond in self-defense to the direct, 
immediate source of an attack, during the duration of that attack, but also to 
use defensive force in response to one attack as a means to deter like attacks 
prospectively. In an interview conducted one year after the Thirty-Four Day 
War, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert invoked the “need to restore 
deterrence” to justify Israel’s resort to self-defense and said the war had 
succeeded.339 He referred in this regard to Nasrallah’s widely reported view 
that had Nasrallah known what would eventuate because of his decision to 
order the kidnappings, “he wouldn’t have started the war.”340 
Again, the point of emphasis is not whether the parties violated the jus 
ad bellum or the jus in bello. Whatever one’s conclusions on these issues, the 
Thirty-Four Day War evinces ad bellum-in bello conflation and, in particular, 
widespread confusion about the meaning of each body of law’s distinct 
proportionality component. Given geopolitical, military, and technological 
change since 1945, the law of war can no longer afford to take the path of 
least resistance adopted by the ICJ in the Armed Activities judgment handed 
down one year before this tragedy in Lebanon. It can no longer afford to elide 
the issue of how the jus ad bellum applies to unconventional scenarios—
which have, in reality, become far more common than “conventional” ones. 
By neglecting them, the law not only fails to offer guidance or to influence the 
conduct of participants in contemporary wars; it also facilitates abuses by 
those participants—state and nonstate alike. 
3. The Resurrection of Rationalized Torture 
In February 2008, Michael Hayden, Director General of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), acknowledged that the CIA had subjected three al-
Qaeda detainees to waterboarding in 2002 and 2003,341 although he said that it 
had not used waterboarding since then.342 The U.S. executive branch presently 
refuses, however, to acknowledge that waterboarding is either illegal as such 
or a form of torture. In fact, in a letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. 
Attorney General Mukasey wrote that waterboarding might again be 
authorized in the future, although 
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the CIA director would [first] have to . . . ask [the Attorney General] . . . if its use would 
be lawful—taking into account the particular facts and circumstances at issue, including 
how and why it is to be used, the limits of its use, and the safeguards that are in place for 
its use.343  
He added that in “some circumstances . . . current law would appear clearly to 
prohibit waterboarding’s use. But other circumstances would present a far 
closer question.”344 Rudy Giuliani, the former mayor of New York City and 
Republican presidential candidate, suggested in a similar vein that 
waterboarding’s legality “depends on how it’s done. It depends on the 
circumstances. It depends on who does it.”345 When Senator Kennedy asked 
Mukasey directly whether waterboarding is torture, Mukasey replied that were 
it “done to [him],” he “would feel that it was,”346 but he refused to classify it 
legally as torture and therefore as categorically prohibited under extant law.  
Other high-level officials have similarly defended, frequently on 
utilitarian grounds, techniques they refer to euphemistically as measures of 
“enhanced” interrogation. Vice President Richard Cheney said that CIA 
interrogation abroad is “a tougher program, for tougher customers,” which 
“has uncovered a wealth of information that has foiled attacks against the 
United States.”347 Justice Antonin Scalia argued that an imminent threat could 
justify “smacking someone in the face” and suggested that this position puts 
one on a slippery slope to torture.348 These and comparable views contrast 
starkly with past U.S. treatment of torture generally and waterboarding in 
particular, which the United States had formerly not only characterized clearly 
as torture but also prosecuted as a capital crime. 349  As of this writing, 
Congress’s effort to limit CIA interrogation techniques to those listed in the 
Army Field Manual, which explicitly prohibits waterboarding, have met with 
repeated opposition from the executive branch.350 
It would be a needless digression to revisit contemporary debates over 
the “ticking time-bomb” scenario, about which much has been written.351 
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Rather, consider what these debates indicate about the continuing vitality of 
the dualistic axiom. In the first place, there can be no real question that 
waterboarding is torture under international law. The Convention Against 
Torture defines torture as 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed 
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or 
for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is 
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity.352 
The Convention, which the United States has ratified, further states: “No 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justification of torture.” 353  Now, it is nonetheless perfectly 
reasonable—and, I believe, also politically desirable and appropriate—to 
debate transparently whether the Convention’s absolute prohibition on torture 
(and customary law to the same effect) continues to reflect the right policy 
given contemporary threats; or whether we should modify the law so that 
torture will henceforth be subject to some form of consequentialist analysis.354 
But there can be no real legal question that this would be a change to, not a 
plausible or bona fide interpretation of, current law. Given the ordinary 
meaning of the Convention,355 it is disingenuous to suggest otherwise. 
Were torture no longer to be prohibited categorically, but instead 
subjected to a consequentialist analysis, it would be emblematic of two recent 
trends: on the one hand, the proliferation of IHL rules in the postwar era; on 
the other, a countervailing trend to transform IHL rules of an absolute nature 
into the kind of flexible, context-dependent constraints represented by 
principles of military necessity, proportionality, and distinction.356 In part, this 
phenomenon involves a tacit regression to the discredited just war idea that, 
contrary to the dualistic axiom, the jus in bello may differ based on the nature 
of the conflict or of the enemy—that is, based on ad bellum factors. Yet the 
jus ad bellum remains, as it has been historically, oft-politicized, manipulable, 
and subject to self-serving interpretations based on the ideological 
commitments of the belligerents. Hence, it is said, waterboarding’s legality 
depends on “who does it”;357  or that the manifestly euphemistic “tougher 
program” applied by the CIA to detainees abroad is lawful because of 
“tougher customers.” 358  Again, a paramount problem with such clear 
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356. See Reisman, supra note 186, at 854-55. 
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sentiments. Michael Cooper & Marc Santora, McCain Rebukes Giuliani on Waterboarding Remark, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A23. 
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violations of the dualistic axiom—with rendering theoretically uniform in 
bello obligations dependent on self-serving ad bellum characterizations—is 
that putative changes to international law cannot be limited in practice, even if 
they can be in normative ethics, to some belligerents but not others. In short, if 
the law against torture depends on who does it, there is no law against torture. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE DUALISTIC AXIOM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
Law can control conduct by, among other strategies, prohibition and 
regulation. The law of war, including the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, 
uses both strategies. The jus ad bellum tries to minimize resort to force in the 
first place by prohibiting it except for self-defense and force authorized by the 
Security Council. 359  But contemporary international law recognizes that, 
historically, the prohibition strategy has been—at best and charitably—
partially successful. Since the late nineteenth century, the law of war has 
therefore focused increasingly on regulation: first, by elaborating flexible in 
bello principles of military necessity, proportionality, and discrimination; 
second, by dictating that, whatever the utilitarian calculi, some tactics, such as 
torture, should be absolutely prohibited; and third, by regulating the scope or 
intensity of force by means of customary principles of ad bellum necessity and 
proportionality.360 
The dualistic axiom is indispensable to the efficacy of the law of war, 
such as it may be, because it theoretically ensures that relatively common, 
though debatable, ad bellum violations (that is, violations of the prohibition 
strategy) do not obviate or diminish the force of the regulatory strategy. As 
this Article suggests, however, modernity has witnessed an erosion of the 
dualistic axiom. In part, this reflects the practical pressures brought to bear on 
the law of war by advances in technology, geopolitical reconfiguration 
following the Cold War, and evolution in the nature of war itself. To retain 
relevance and potential efficacy, the law must candidly acknowledge and 
adapt to these changes, not elide them, as has the ICJ. It must also clarify the 
law’s regulatory constraints, especially proportionality, with far more analytic 
rigor than it has to date. 
I do not mean we should abandon the strategy of prohibition, as some 
suggest. I agree with appropriately qualified views that, for all its failings, the 
U.N. Charter framework prohibiting war as a general tool of statecraft 
                                                                                                                                                                         
359. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
360. The Charter says nothing about necessity and proportionality, but Nicaragua, which 
technically purported to construe customary international law on the use of force, held that custom 
imposes these ad bellum constraints simultaneously on all uses of armed force, see Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 127 (June 27), and this 
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Commentators generally trace the requirements of ad bellum necessity and proportionality to the famous 
Caroline incident. See id. at 248; see also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 420 (Sir Robert Jennings 
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(necessary or not, proportionate or not) for any reason. For an account of the Caroline incident, see 2 
JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217, at 409-14 (1906); see also R.Y. 
Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 82 (1938). 
104 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  [Vol. 34: 47 
 
 
diminishes the aggregate level of unauthorized coercion.361 But it would be 
advisable for international law to focus also, and more deliberately, on 
refining the ad bellum and in bello regulatory strategies to meet the new 
geostrategic, military, and technological developments in warfare in the 
twenty-first century. To conclude, I therefore want to propose four 
clarifications or refinements of the dualistic axiom. 
A. Preservation of the Axiom 
As the dualistic axiom traditionally insists, ad bellum judgments should 
neither obviate nor modify in bello obligations. This means, first, that in bello 
constraints of a deontological, absolute nature must not be transformed sub 
silentio into contingent norms that may, in circumstances characterized as 
supreme emergency or otherwise, be subjected to consequentialist calculi. 
That change seems, as argued earlier, to reflect an anachronistic view that 
ascribes moral value to states as states, whereas contemporary international 
law regards people, not states, as the fundamental unit of value. It would also 
introduce into the law self-serving, oft-politicized judgments about the 
comparative value of polities. Whatever their truth, judgments of this kind 
degrade the jus in bello. Finally, this change could not be limited in practice to 
only certain polities. Again, if the international law against torture, for 
example, depends on who does it, or on under what circumstances, then, given 
how international law operates, there is no law against torture. Those who 
would change the absolute nature of certain in bello constraints may therefore 
want to consider the long-term, aggregate, and systemic consequences of such 
a change. For just as such changes cannot be limited to some polities but not 
others, neither can their scope be limited only to exigency. Torture, to stick 
with the same (regrettably timely) example, has a documented metastatic 
tendency, as the Abu Ghraib scandal illustrates.362 The same goes for other in 
bello violations justified by supreme emergency theory. 
Conversely, preserving the dualistic axiom requires, second, that in bello 
constraints of a flexible, consequentialist nature—those that do call for a 
balance between military advantage and civilian harm—be worked out 
concretely on a fact-sensitive, case-by-case basis. It would be a grave error, in 
law even if not necessarily in normative ethics, to understand “military 
advantage” architecturally, that is, as a concept that leads inexorably to one 
belligerent’s ultimate casus belli or to victory. If we view military advantage 
that way, it becomes difficult to escape the logic of writers like McMahan, 
who hold that the dualistic axiom cannot be sustained because the jus ad 
bellum inevitably affects, at a minimum, in bello proportionality. That is, in 
fact, why Protocol I and other formulations of the in bello proportionality 
constraint avoid architectural terms. They instead forbid strikes that would be 
excessive, not relative to the casus belli, but “to the concrete and direct 
                                                                                                                                                                         
361. E.g., Henkin, supra note 214. 
362. See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 351, at 1716-17 (citing, inter alia, Henry Shue, Torture, 7 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 124, 143 (1978)); see also Reisman, supra note 186, at 855-56. 
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military advantage anticipated.”363 By articulating a conception of in bello 
proportionality at a lower level of abstraction, one tied to the concrete facts on 
the ground rather than dependent on abstract perceptions of ultimate justice or 
legal right, IHL strives to remove in bello proportionality calculi from oft-
politicized ad bellum judgments.364 
To be sure, it is doubtful that belligerents will always, or even often, be 
able to divorce these calculi entirely from their views about the legality or 
justice of the conflict. But in the first place, that is why the law insists on it; 
and second, in point of fact, IHL may be able to realize this aspiration more 
often than one might initially think. In conflicts between belligerents of 
roughly equal power, traditional enforcement dynamics like reciprocity 
encourage IHL compliance. In contrast, in conflicts where one party enjoys an 
overwhelming military advantage, such as the 1991 Gulf War or the Kosovo 
conflict, that party can often afford, so to speak, to adhere to IHL strictly—
and it will have both reputational and humanitarian incentives to do so. 
Technology may also enable the stronger party to avoid significant (or 
perhaps, as in Kosovo, any) risk to its combatants, although the in bello 
lawfulness of this strategy is questionable. 
Third, preserving the dualistic axiom requires that we recognize and 
confront candidly a new form of asymmetrical warfare: where one party is an 
elusive nonstate belligerent like al-Qaeda or a cognate “network of 
networks.” 365  Its goals may be unclear, or simply incompatible with 
nonnegotiable international human rights standards.366 In this context, superior 
technology and military force in conventional terms will not offer the same 
advantages—and, incidentally, the same incentives to abide strictly by the jus 
in bello—as exist in the conflicts described above. It is here, as we have 
witnessed in the struggle against al-Qaeda and other manifestations of sacred 
terrorism,367 that the temptation to violate the dualistic axiom (justified, often, 
by the allegedly novel nature of the enemy or the conflict) becomes strong.368 
The problem is that, once initiated, putative changes to the law cannot, 
realistically, be micromanaged, for example, by seeking to characterize the 
changes as applicable to some belligerents but not others. In reality, they 
spread rapidly, permeate the international legal process and the perspectives 
of its participants at many levels, and broadly influence the conduct of 
hostilities. Proposed modifications to the law of war should therefore ideally 
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be the product of a multilateral, transparent deliberative process rather than of 
unilateral, opaque decisions.369 
Fourth, exigencies that are perceived, at least, as supreme emergencies 
will inevitably arise. It would be unrealistic to think that political elites 
charged with the responsibility for protecting their constituents will always 
obey the law of war. But that does not necessarily counsel changing the law. 
Law is one normative system; it is not everything. Sometimes it will—and 
perhaps should—be disobeyed in the service of the values and policies that 
inform its content.370 But in a liberal democratic polity governed by the rule of 
law, elites who arrogate to themselves the power to act extralegally must, at a 
minimum, do so transparently, subjecting themselves to “after-the-fact 
political scrutiny.”371 Political exigency itself cannot be grounds to override 
the law of war, lest it cease to exert even minimal influence on the conduct of 
hostilities that all but the most cynical of critics will generally admit, let alone 
to offer guidance to elites operating in good faith under favorable 
circumstances for rigorous application of the law.  
B. Concurrent Application of Ad Bellum and In Bello Proportionality 
Ad bellum law, including that of self-defense, operates principally at the 
level of polities. What value, if any, should the collective nature of polities 
receive in the determination of ad bellum proportionality? Despite profound 
postwar changes to international law, states continue to enjoy belligerent 
rights that are denied to other collectives. A conventional rationale for this is 
that states possess an associative value beyond the aggregative value 
constituted by the sum of their constituents’ interests.372 But this associative 
value normatively depends on the nature of the state, on its political and legal 
system, and on the extent to which its constituents constitute a genuine polity. 
And at any rate, it must be a distinct question whether normative judgments 
about this value should bear on the law of war applicable to different polities. 
Historically, each belligerent—and today, that includes not only states 
but terrorist networks, criminal syndicates, insurgent groups, and so on—
claims the mantle of justice or self-defense for itself and denies it to the other. 
Mindful of this fact, it is clear that drawing normative distinctions between 
belligerents will badly disserve the values and policies that today underwrite 
the law of war: minimizing unauthorized coercion in the first place and 
reducing needless suffering and human rights violations in war. Because 
polities will predictably continue to make politicized ad bellum judgments, 
both components of proportionality should be kept distinct and applied 
concurrently.  
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Consequently, just as the dualistic axiom insists that the jus in bello 
applies equally to all parties, so too should it be understood to insist that ad 
bellum proportionality, the principal regulatory component of the modern jus 
ad bellum, applies uniformly, “without any adverse distinction based on the 
nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or 
attributed to the Parties to the conflict.”373 The ICJ’s jurisprudence has ill 
served postwar international law in this regard. Because force often proves 
insusceptible to prohibition, the law should focus equal or more attention on 
regulation. Rather than content itself with condemning states for ad bellum 
violations of the Charter under Nicaragua’s often anachronistic and 
incongruous framework, the Court, and other jurisgenerative institutions, 
should develop a more coherent and detailed conception of ad bellum 
proportionality. Insistence on the regulation of (allegedly) defensive force by 
the ad bellum proportionality constraint will be more likely to influence a 
state’s conduct than a categorical, black-or-white pronouncement that its 
resort to force violates the Charter. 
C. Exceptions to the Axiom? 
The Kosovo conflict raises the question whether international law should 
ever countenance limited exceptions to, or modest relaxation of, the dualistic 
axiom. Suppose that a zero-casualty military campaign taking advantage of 
modern military technology is the sole politically feasible and practicable way 
to stop genocide or comparably serious human rights atrocities. Suppose 
further some state, or coalition of states, were able and willing to undertake 
that campaign provided it sustained essentially no casualties—but not 
otherwise. If that campaign, strictly speaking, would violate the jus in bello, 
should it ever, nonetheless, be authorized? On the one hand, it may be the 
only way to terminate an unconscionable crisis of the sort represented by the 
Rwandan genocide of 1994. On the other, it is inevitable that numerous 
innocent civilians will die, lose their homes, and suffer horrible injuries 
because, metaphorically speaking, technology, despite its tremendous 
advances, has yet to create a smart enough bomb. 
This scenario poses a stark conflict of theoretically harmonious values. 
IHL, including the dualistic axiom, seeks to limit superfluous suffering and to 
protect human rights in war. International human rights law—including the 
jus cogens prohibition on genocide and the solemn, but tragically hypocritical, 
“never again” proclamations that postdate every genocide—counsel prompt 
intervention to halt atrocities on this scale. The goals of a humanized IHL may 
at times prove to be in at least modest tension with international human rights 
imperatives. Contrary to the dualistic axiom, it may be that in certain cases (in 
particular, where intervention in arguable violation of the dualistic axiom is 
the sole way to stop serious human rights atrocities), the same values that 
underwrite that axiom should countenance limited exceptions to it.374 I stress 
“may” because the answer will almost certainly depend on fact-sensitive and 
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value-intensive judgments that it would be imprudent to resolve in the 
abstract. Here, I only want to observe the potential tension between, on the 
one hand, a traditional axiom of IHL, which on the whole this paper has 
defended, and on the other, jus cogens norms to which international law is 
equally committed.  
Another form of (at least arguable) violation of the axiom that has been 
evident recently poses a comparable, though perhaps less stark, tension: 
should a belligerent’s casus belli ever be germane to what commentators 
increasingly refer to as the jus post bellum, i.e., the law governing, not only 
belligerent occupation, but at times, the transformation and reconstruction of a 
state after war? Traditionally, the law of war insisted that belligerents 
occupying another state, regardless of their casus belli, leave its laws and 
institutions untouched to the greatest extent compatible with military 
necessity, strictly defined. Recent nation-building exercises in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, among other places, challenge this view. The emerging 
idea of transformative occupation, whatever its other merits, may well be in 
tension with the dualistic axiom.375 Perhaps international law should authorize 
and even encourage this phenomenon in some circumstances anyway. Again, I 
raise the question to highlight a normative tension that the dualistic axiom 
may create in contemporary international law, not to suggest a categorical 
answer. 
D. Clarifying Ad Bellum and In Bello Proportionality 
International law must clarify, and insist on the strict implementation of, 
the distinction between ad bellum and in bello proportionality. Failure to do so 
is a characteristic mistake made by, for example, critics of the Thirty-Four 
Day War.376 This mistake in part reflects international law’s failure to explain 
proportionality except in terms so abstract as to border on the tautological.377 
Exploring proportionality in depth would require a separate paper. But I want 
to note here a few distinctions between ad bellum and in bello proportionality 
in an effort to clarify the proper application of each. 
Ad bellum proportionality seeks to limit the quantum of force used in 
any resort to force. On one side of the scale, so to speak, is the casus belli, 
typically, an assertion of self-defense. But on the other, the relevant concept is 
not, as it would be for in bello proportionality, “collateral damage.” Ad bellum 
proportionality is instead parasitic on ad bellum necessity. It is the imperative 
to use, to quote Webster’s famous statement in the Caroline incident, no more 
force that necessary under the circumstances: “the act, justified by the 
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept clearly 
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within it.”378  An act is ad bellum disproportionate if the same ad bellum 
objective sought by force clearly could have been achieved by diplomacy or 
another nonviolent strategy at a roughly comparable, or even moderately 
greater, cost.379 
One plausible reading of Caroline, which the ICJ has adopted, is the 
“atomized” view: that defensive force must be limited to what is immediately 
necessary to respond to the direct source of an attack. Ad bellum 
proportionality, in this view, means that “the intensity of self-defense must be 
about the same as the intensity defended against.” 380  This parsimonious, 
almost lex talionis, position leads to absurd results and does not conform to 
state practice. In Oil Platforms, for example, it meant that once the attack on 
the Sea Isle City ended, so too did any necessity for self-defense. Any 
subsequent response would perforce be needless and disproportionate were it 
directed against an Iranian target other than the source of the Iranian missile. 
No state, in practice, would accept this conception of ad bellum 
proportionality if faced with repeated assaults from another state’s territory, 
notwithstanding Nicaragua and its progeny. 
The principal alternative conception of ad bellum proportionality is the 
“aggregative” view: self-defense must be ad bellum proportionate to the 
aggregate attacks on a state rather than to the specific, atomized attack that 
ultimately instigated defensive force. Ad bellum proportionality, in this view, 
means that “force, even if it is more intensive than [the casus belli] is 
permissible so long as it is not designed to do anything more than protect the 
territorial integrity or other vital interests of the defending party.”381  The 
italicized phrase, plainly, invites abuses, but the aggregative view is much 
more realistic than the atomized view. Hence, when the United States 
responded to 9/11 by not only targeting al-Qaeda training camps, but by 
invading Afghanistan and ousting the Taliban, few condemned it even though 
it had violated ad bellum proportionality as elaborated by the ICJ. In part, this 
may be because of the unprecedented scale of the attack on U.S. soil. But it is 
also because the aggregative view reflects a more accurate conception of ad 
bellum proportionality, which is better suited to modern warfare and more 
likely to be accepted by states. 
The U.S. invasion may be deemed ad bellum proportionate because it 
responded, not to a single attack, but to a series of attacks by al-Qaeda, 
including the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. 
Cole, and because the Taliban offered al-Qaeda a friendly host state. Israel’s 
decision to attack Hezbollah in 2006 likewise reflected the aggregative view 
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of ad bellum proportionality. After all, the immediate impetus for Israel’s 
resort to force did not justify the scale of its attack. The question, however, is 
whether Hezbollah’s attacks, in the aggregate and over time, did.382  That 
Israel’s initial resort to force, in this view, may be deemed ad bellum 
proportionate does not, of course, imply that Israel made either a prudent or an 
advisable decision. But on the aggregative view of ad bellum proportionality, 
it made a lawful one relative to Hezbollah.  
Given the nature of modern warfare, the aggregative view of ad bellum 
proportionality is inevitable. In increasingly common scenarios of 
asymmetrical power, nonstate belligerents will characteristically use force 
intermittently. This means, typically, a series of discrete strikes, no one of 
which, considered in isolation, will suffice as an “armed attack” under 
Nicaragua. But small-scale, irregular attacks, even cross-border incursions, of 
this kind have become more the rule than the exception today. The legal 
question can no longer be, as Nicaragua said, whether a small-scale armed 
incursion transgresses the line between “frontier incident” and “armed attack”; 
only the latter authorizes self-defense.383 States, animated by, among other 
forces, domestic political pressures, will at some point decide that, in the 
aggregate, a series of discrete, comparatively trivial attacks by nonstate actors 
operating from the territory of a host or failed state justifies self-defense. The 
ICJ’s contrary insistence on the parsimonious, atomized view of ad bellum 
proportionality simply encourages states to disregard it and, in some cases, 
eviscerates it as an independent regulatory constraint on force. It also 
unjustifiably condemns as unlawful many perfectly reasonable and 
appropriate uses of defensive force. 
In contrast to ad bellum proportionality, which often involves a partially 
subjective judgment about one side’s casus belli, its in bello analogue strives 
to be agnostic and objective relative to the asserted casus belli. Each discrete 
application of force must be proportional in that it not inflict harm that is 
excessive relative to the concrete military advantage sought in particular 
instances.384 The goal to which that military advantage contributes should not 
matter. In bello proportionality does not involve balancing a range of in bello 
harms (civilian death, injury, property destruction) against ultimate ad bellum 
rationales for resort to armed force (self-defense, humanitarian intervention, 
territorial conquest). It rather specifies a concrete conception of military 
necessity that is tied closely to operational judgments made by military 
strategists based on the particular facts on the ground.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
382. Hurka, in the just war context, draws a critical distinction in this regard between 
“sufficient” and “contributing” just causes that applies equally to law. Some “goods,” such as deterring 
an enemy, may not be sufficient to authorize the initial resort to armed force. Yet once a state responds 
in self-defense, those goods may legitimately be counted as aims of defensive force. Hurka, supra note 
14, at 41. In Oil Platforms, for example, it would have been unlawful for the United States to attack 
Iran’s offshore oil platforms to deter Iranian attacks on neutral vessels preemptively. But once the Sea 
Isle City had been struck by a missile and the Samuel B. Roberts mined by Iran, it became legitimate for 
the United States to consider, as a matter of ad bellum proportionality, that attacks on the offshore oil 
platforms would deter comparable attacks threatening vital U.S. interests in the future. 
383. Greenwood, supra note 222, at 381. 
384. See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 51(5)(b); cf. Rome Statute, supra note 152, art. 
8(2)(a)(iv). 
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So for in bello proportionality, the answer to the question “proportional 
to what?” is not, as it is for ad bellum proportionality, the military necessity or 
the casus belli. It is the “incidental loss to civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,” and the question is 
whether those harms “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.”385 The details of this principle, too, urgently 
need to be worked out more concretely than they have been to date.386 The 
Prosecutor’s Report on Kosovo incisively observes that in bello 
proportionality requires answers to, among other perplexing questions, the 
following: 
a) What are the relative values to be assigned to the military advantage gained and the 
injury to non-combatants or the damage to civilian objects? 
b) What do you include or exclude in totaling your sums? 
c) What is the standard of measurement in time or space? and  
d) To what extent is a military commander obligated to expose his own forces to danger 
in order to limit civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects?387 
The problem is not that international law provides the wrong answers to these 
questions; it is that often it provides no answer or only a very abstract one. 
Given the emerging geopolitical, strategic, and technological trends of twenty-
first-century conflicts, whether the dualistic axiom can be preserved today 
depends in part on whether in bello proportionality can be operationalized in 
detail and coherently without reference to ad bellum goals. 
 
* * * * 
 
The ICJ’s pathological dispositif in Nuclear Weapons is emblematic of 
the true cost of conflation: it degrades the efficacy and normative force of 
both ad bellum and in bello law. It leads to a failure to apply them properly, or 
at all, and therefore encourages a more violent world public order, 
characterized by more needless suffering and human rights violations than 
would be the case were each component of the law of war applied rigorously. 
The Nuclear Weapons opinion also shows why the postwar, humanized law of 
war tries, at least, not to confuse the interests and values of abstractions, like 
states, with those of concrete human beings. The dualistic axiom will 
doubtless come under pressure in the twenty-first century, as it has already. 
But it remains indispensable to IHL based on our historical experience with 
the political and moral reality of war. The law of war must strive, even while 
recognizing and confronting modern challenges candidly, to preserve the 
axiom and maintain a rigorous analytic distinction between the legality of, 
respectively, the initiation and conduct of hostilities—even if, inevitably, it 
                                                                                                                                                                         
385. Protocol I, supra note 30, art. 57(2)(a)(iii) (emphasis added); see also HCJ 796/02 Pub. 
Comm. Against Torture v. Gov’t of Israel, [2006] ¶ 46 (stressing that military advantage must not be 
speculative but rather direct and anticipated). 
386. Fenwick, supra note 153, at 545-46. 
387. ICTY REPORT, supra note 294, at 1271 (2000); see also MICHAEL WALZER, Two Kinds of 
Military Responsibility, in ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 18, at 23; Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, 
A Development of Modest Proportions: The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in the 
Targeted Killings Case, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 310, 316 (2007); Hurka, supra note 14. 
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does not always realize its aspiration. For the dualistic axiom can rightly be 
hailed as one of the paramount achievements of the postwar law of war. 
